UNTANGLING CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN DIFC AND ONSHORE COURTS

I. INTRODUCTION

  1. The evolution of the DIFC Courts has been defined as much by questions of jurisdiction and applicable law as by developments in substantive law. This is inherent not only in their coexistence within Dubai’s and the UAE’s civil law judicial framework, where jurisdictional tension has at times manifested in parallel proceedings, but also in their deliberate policy orientation as an international commercial court supporting the rule of law in transnational trade and commerce.[i] Functioning as both a forum for the resolution of international disputes and a “conduit jurisdiction” for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards, the DIFC Courts have become a key interface between domestic and international legal systems.[ii]
  2. Despite this jurisdictional demarcation, conflict has persisted. The boundaries between the DIFC Courts and Dubai’s onshore judiciary, though conceptually distinct, have frequently overlapped in practice, particularly in matters of enforcement and arbitral supervision. Ambiguities in contractual drafting, especially where parties refer simply to “Dubai” or “the courts of Dubai”, have further complicated this interface, producing parallel claims, inconsistent enforcement actions, and uncertainty over the supervisory court in arbitration-related disputes. The DIFC Courts have noted the adverse effects of such conflict, that inconsistent or contradictory judgments by the different courts in a single jurisdiction create uncertainty and bring the system of justice in that jurisdiction into disrepute.[iii] These recurring overlaps have underscored the need for mechanisms capable of reconciling judicial competence within Dubai’s dual-court framework.
  3. Recent developments, including the establishment of the Conflict of Jurisdictions Tribunal (“CJT”) and the enactment of the new Courts Law No. 2 of 2025 (“New JAL”), alongside judicial decisions, continue this trajectory of integration and refinement within Dubai’s dual-court system.

II. THE TRANSITION FROM THE JJC TO THE CJT

  1. The policy of reconciling judicial competence within Dubai’s dual-court structure was first institutionalised through the Joint Judicial Committee (“JJC”) under the Dubai Decree No. 19 of 2016. The JJC was designed to resolve jurisdictional conflicts between the DIFC and Dubai Courts. However, the JJC was often perceived as curtailing the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts, and in particular, their developing role as a conduit forum for the recognition and enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards.[iv]
  2. In practice, parties opposing enforcement before the DIFC Courts often commenced parallel proceedings before the Dubai Courts, triggering an application to the JJC. Under Article 5 of the Dubai Decree No. 19 of 2016, such an application automatically stayed proceedings in both courts pending the JJC’s determination. The stay operated even where the asserted conflict was manufactured, and in most cases, the JJC ultimately ruled in favour of the Dubai courts. The result was that enforcement actions before the DIFC Courts were frozen for extended periods, and litigants gained a tactical device to delay execution, putting the Courts’ conduit function at risk.
  3. This dynamic was illustrated in JJC cases such as Daman v Oger Dubai,[v] Dubai Waterfront v Liu,[vi] and Endofa v D’Amico Shipping,[vii] where the JJC held that the Dubai courts were the competent forum, invoking “the general principles of law embodied in the procedural laws” without elaborating on the content of that expression. In each instance, the DIFC members of the JJC entered dissenting opinions affirming the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction to recognise and enforce judgments and awards for onward execution.
  4. The DIFC Courts themselves were alert to the difficulties caused by the JJC framework. In Lakhan v Lamia, the DIFC Court of Appeal (“CA”) refused to grant a stay pending JJC proceedings, effectively narrowing the scope of Article 5 of the Dubai Decree No. 19 of 2016. The Court cautioned that “mere application to the JJC does not trigger a stay”, warning that automatic suspension could encourage “spurious applications” designed to manufacture conflicts of jurisdiction.[vii] Further, in Tavira Securities v Point Ventures, the DIFC Court of First Instance (“CFI”) declined to treat the JJC’s determinations as binding precedent, observing that “the JJC established under Dubai Decree 19 of 2016 is hostile to conduit enforcement”.[ix] Such decisions reflected the DIFC judiciary’s growing concern that the JJC’s structure and practice risked enabling procedural abuse and undermining confidence in the DIFC’s enforcement regime.
  5. These issues, together with the perception of imbalance within the JJC’s composition and practice, prompted the reform in the Dubai Decree No. 29 of 2024 (“Decree 29”), which established the CJT to replace the JJC. The CJT represents a more structured and balanced approach to resolving jurisdictional overlap. Its composition mirrors that of its predecessor, with three judges from each court and a chair from the Dubai Courts holding a casting vote. The CJT’s jurisdiction, however, extends beyond conflicts between the two courts to include other judicial entities in Dubai, such as the Rental Disputes Settlement Centre and tribunals created by decree or resolution.
    1. Crucially, Article 7 eliminates the automatic stay previously triggered upon referral to the JJC. The CJT must first determine that it has competence before any stay of proceedings or enforcement can be granted. The CJT is further bound by Resolution 11 of 2024, which prescribes its procedures and time limits, requiring decisions to be issued within 30 days, extendable once for a further 30 days.
    2. In addition, Article 8 introduces a security-deposit requirement of AED 3,000 to be forfeited if the CJT upholds the jurisdiction of the opposing forum. This provision is designed to deter frivolous or tactical referrals and reinforces the Tribunal’s emphasis on efficiency and good faith.
    3. Interestingly, Article 9(c) also introduces a principle of precedent, making CJT decisions binding judicial precedents for both the DIFC and Dubai Courts. This innovation is familiar to the DIFC’s common law practice but novel within the civil law tradition of the Dubai Courts.
  6. Since its operationalisation in July 2024, the CJT has considered 16 applications. Of these, 5 were dismissed under Article 4 of Decree 29 for lack of a genuine conflict of jurisdiction. The remaining 11 were decided on the merits, with the Tribunal upholding the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts in 7 cases and that of the Dubai Courts in 5. A detailed analysis of the CJT’s decisions is set out in Schedule I. The decisions already seem to reflect a more balanced approach. For instance:
    1. The CJT has confirmed the primacy of the supervisory court, holding that when the seat of arbitration lies in Dubai, annulment and enforcement proceedings must proceed before the Dubai Courts, even if parallel enforcement has been initiated in the DIFC.[x] Conversely, where the seat is in the DIFC, enforcement or related proceedings before the Dubai Courts must yield to the set aside proceedings in the DIFC.[xi]
    2. In a landmark and timely decision, given the ongoing debate surrounding freestanding injunctions,[xii] the CJT found no conflict of jurisdiction where the DIFC Court had granted a freezing order in support of a Dubai-seated arbitration, noting that such precautionary measures do not encroach on the merits of the dispute.[xiii] The decision underscores the supportive function of the DIFC Courts within Dubai’s judicial framework and affirms their authority to grant freestanding injunctions and interim relief, even in aid of arbitrations seated outside the DIFC.
    3. The CJT has also clarified that parallel enforcement of the same judgment does not, by itself, constitute a jurisdictional conflict.[xiv] It held that simultaneous execution before the DIFC and Dubai Courts was procedural rather than jurisdictional, as both were enforcing the same underlying Dubai judgment.
  7. Despite the establishment of the CJT, questions remain regarding the relationship between its authority and the DIFC Courts’ inherent jurisdiction, particularly where both mechanisms may appear to address overlapping subject matter. This issue was considered in Nael v Niamh Bank, where the CA examined whether its powers were affected by the CJT’s competence to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction.[xv]
  8. The case arose from on-demand guarantees issued by the defendant bank in connection with a large construction project. The guarantees were governed by the “laws of Dubai (outside the DIFC)” and provided for a DIFC-seated arbitration. When the contractor entered insolvency proceedings in Dubai, the claimant employer terminated the contract and demanded payment under the guarantees, which the defendant bank refused. In arbitration, the arbitral tribunal issued an award in favour of the claimant. The bank petitioned the Dubai Bankruptcy Court to stay the liquidation of the guarantees, citing potential prejudice to the insolvency estate. The court granted the stay ex parte and despite the award. In parallel, the claimant sought enforcement of the award before the DIFC Courts, where the bank applied for a set aside, arguing that the Dubai order created a conflicting judgment and that recognition of the award would breach UAE public policy.
  9. On appeal, the CA upheld enforcement, rejecting the bank’s challenge. It held that while inconsistent judgments may in principle violate UAE public policy, the factual matrix did not amount to such a conflict because the Dubai insolvency order involved a different party (the contractor) and a different subject matter than the DIFC enforcement action. Importantly, the Court held that reference to the CJT is appropriate only where there exists a prima facie conflict of jurisdiction between the same parties and the same subject matter. It emphasised that Decree 29 does not operate to oust or suspend the DIFC Courts’ inherent jurisdiction to grant anti-suit injunctions or other equitable remedies, even in circumstances where overlapping proceedings might exist elsewhere in Dubai. The CJT, it observed, functions as a coordinating mechanism to prevent genuine jurisdictional conflict, not as an exclusive tribunal displacing the DIFC Courts’ supervisory or protective powers.

III. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS AND COMITY UNDER THE NEW JAL

  1. Article 14(C) of the New JAL introduces, for the first time, an express statutory discretion for the DIFC Courts to decline jurisdiction in defined circumstances, effectively codifying principles of restraint and comity that had previously evolved through case law. It provides that the DIFC Courts may, even where jurisdiction is otherwise established, decline to hear a matter (i) if the dispute is subject to a written agreement conferring jurisdiction on another court, or (ii) if another UAE court has already issued a final, enforceable judgment capable of execution within the DIFC.
  2. This provision serves two purposes. First, it prevents the duplication of proceedings and conflicting outcomes within the Emirate’s judicial system. Second, it signals a policy alignment with the CJT, embedding into the Courts’ own statutory framework a mechanism of self-regulation that mirrors the institutional coordination the CJT was designed to achieve.
  3. The contours of Article 14(C) are, however, yet to be fully examined. Its first substantive application appears to have been in Union Insurance v IPMR.[xvi]
  4. The significance of this case lies in its procedural history, which spans both the pre- and post-New JAL eras. In September 2023, the CFI dismissed the defendant’s jurisdictional challenge, holding that a clause submitting disputes to “the courts of the UAE” encompassed the DIFC Courts.[xvii] The judgment adopted the reasoning of the CA in Horizon Energy LLC v ABNIC[xviii] and IGPL v Standard Chartered Bank,[xix] affirming that such clauses could operate as valid opt-ins to DIFC jurisdiction where the commercial context and the parties’ choice of English law supported that interpretation. Permission to appeal was refused, confirming the DIFC Courts’ competence to hear the matter.
  5. Yet in May 2025, after the New JAL had come into force, the defendant invoked Article 14(C)(2), pointing to a final judgment of the Sharjah Courts (upheld by the Union Supreme Court) on the same underlying dispute. While acknowledging that the DIFC Courts continued to have jurisdiction, the CFI accepted this argument and granted an indefinite stay, reasoning that the purpose of Article 14(C)(2) was to “prevent duplication and conflicting rulings within the UAE judicial system” and treated the stay as a pragmatic exercise of that discretion. Permission to appeal was refused at first instance,[xx] but it remains to be seen whether leave is being pursued before the CA.
  6. This outcome, though textually consistent with Article 14(C), may sit uncomfortably alongside the earlier rulings in the same case. Having previously affirmed jurisdiction through detailed reasoning that drew on authority, the DIFC Courts’ subsequent stay effectively reopened the very question they had already settled – formally respectful of comity, yet arguably harsh on the claimant that had acted consistently with the earlier DIFC ruling. It remains to be seen whether future cases will construe Article 14(C) narrowly, as a tool for deferring to final onshore judgments, or more broadly as a general power of case-management restraint in the interests of comity.
  7. A contrasting illustration of the same principle emerged in Ivankovich v KJM Marine.[xxi] While Union Insurance demonstrates judicial restraint under Article 14(C), Ivankovich reflects the DIFC Courts’ continued willingness to assert jurisdiction where the parties have clearly opted into the DIFC forum. There, the Court granted an anti-suit injunction restraining parallel proceedings before the Dubai Courts, holding that the CJT was not the exclusive mechanism for resolving jurisdictional conflicts. The judgment emphasised that Decree 29 did not preclude the DIFC Courts from issuing injunctions to protect contractual or equitable rights, and that to hold otherwise would invite vexatious or tactical filings before the onshore courts. In doing so, the CFI reaffirmed its inherent equitable powers under Articles 24(D) and (E) of the New JAL and underscored that comity does not require abstention in the face of bad-faith parallel litigation.

IV. DUBAI OR DIFC?

  1. Running parallel to the institutional evolution of Dubai’s dual-court system is a subtler but equally significant development in judicial reasoning: the interpretive treatment of contractual references to “Dubai” or “the Courts of Dubai”. These formulations, long a source of confusion, have often obscured whether the parties intended to confer jurisdiction on the onshore Dubai Courts or the DIFC Courts. The CJT and recent DIFC decisions have continued to clarify where a contextual reading of the parties’ intention may lead to the DIFC.
  2. In NU Projects Technical Services LLC v Yahya Iqbal Ismail, the CJT confronted this question directly.[xxii] The renovation contract referred to the jurisdiction of the “DFSA Courts”. The CJT, adopting a purposive interpretation, held that in an English-language contract between commercial parties, “DFSA Courts” was intended to mean the DIFC Courts. It therefore recognised the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction, reasoning that the parties’ linguistic and commercial context demonstrated a clear opt-in to the DIFC.
  3. In Neville v Nigel, the CFI interpreted an arbitration clause providing for “Dubai arbitration”.[xxiii] The claimant contended that this denoted a DIFC-seated DIAC arbitration, whereas the defendant maintained that it referred to an ad hoc onshore arbitration. The Court held that the phrase “Dubai arbitration” was broad enough to encompass both meanings and that its construction depended on contextual indicators, including the parties’ international profile, use of English law, and lack of nexus to onshore Dubai. Rejecting a mechanical application of the Dubai Decree No. 34 of 2021 (which ties the reference to “Dubai” or “DIFC” seats to the corresponding courts), the Court concluded that the choice of English law supported a DIFC seat. The case underscores that “Dubai” in arbitral clauses is no longer treated as a fixed territorial marker but as a concept to be interpreted in context.
  4. In Valentyna Plewka Kolesnik v Emirates NBD Bank, on appeal from a decision refusing jurisdiction, the SCT interpreted a clause conferring “exclusive jurisdiction of the Applicable Emirate”.[xxiv] The SCT relied on prior authority where the CA had interpreted “Courts of Dubai” as encompassing both the DIFC and onshore courts, absent an express exclusion. It further observed that the DIFC Courts should approach such clauses pragmatically, recognising that sophisticated commercial parties often use “Dubai” as shorthand for the entire Emirate’s judicial system. Thus, unless the drafting demonstrates a clear intention to limit jurisdiction to the onshore courts, references to “Dubai,” “the Courts of Dubai,” or “the Applicable Emirate” can be read to include the DIFC Courts.
  5. By contrast, in Atul Ashok Amir Chand Dhawan v Zurich International Life Limited, the CFI declined jurisdiction over an onshore-incorporated insurer within a financial group licensed in the DIFC.[xxv] The claimant argued that the phrase “non-exclusive jurisdiction of any competent legal authority in the UAE” in the underlying policy documentation was broad enough to include the DIFC Courts, particularly given the insurer’s affiliation with a DIFC-registered entity and the parties’ use of English-language contracts. The Court rejected this contention, holding that “competent legal authority” could not, without explicit language, be equated with the DIFC Courts. Rather, the phrase referred to the judicial body vested with statutory jurisdiction under the UAE law, and its interpretation had to be grounded in the parties’ actual connection to the DIFC, whether through domicile, performance, or express opt-in under Article 14(A)(1) of the New JAL.
  6. Together, these judgments signal a pragmatic balance — liberal enough to uphold commercial intention where context supports DIFC jurisdiction, but cautious against extending it by association or group structure alone.

V. CONCLUSION

  1. The evolution of jurisdictional conflict between the DIFC and onshore courts reflects Dubai’s broader ambition to reconcile its parallel judicial systems under a unified philosophy of comity. The CJT has institutionalised coordination, while Article 14(C) of the New JAL internalises that principle within the DIFC Courts’ own law. It codifies judicial comity, allowing the DIFC Courts to defer to another UAE court where there is a final judgment or an agreed forum, as seen in Union Insurance v IPMR. Yet cases like Ivankovich v KJM Marine illustrate that this restraint coexists with the Courts’ inherent power to prevent vexatious parallel proceedings.
  2. The CJT’s early decisions confirm the primacy of the supervisory court, recognise the DIFC Courts’ supportive authority to grant interim measures even for non-DIFC-seated arbitrations, and interpret references to “Dubai” contextually to include the DIFC where commercially intended. Recent DIFC judgments also clarify when “Dubai” may encompass the DIFC. Together, these developments signal a mature equilibrium between autonomy and comity, where the DIFC and Dubai Courts operate not in competition but in coordination within a unified legal framework.

SCHEDULE I

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[i] [153], Carmon Reestrutura-engenharia E Serviços Técnios Especiais, (Su) LDA v Antonio Joao Catete Lopes Cuenda [2024] DIFC CA 003 (26 November 2024)

[ii] Singularity Legal Insight, ‘DIFC Courts as a Conduit for Enforcement Within and Outside The UAE’ (see here)

[iii] [44], Five Holding Limited v Orient UNB Takaful PJSC [2021] DIFC CFI 027 (4 August 2021)

[iv] Clifford Chance, ‘Judicial Tribunal Decisions – Key Takeaways’ (see here); Herbert Smith Freehills, ‘Dubai's New Judicial Authority: What you need to know’ (see here);

Holman Fenwick Willan LLP, ‘Observations on the first two years of the Joint Judicial Committee’ (see here); Norton RoseFulbright, ‘The Dubai Judicial Tribunal — A claw

back of jurisdiction?’ (see here)

[v] Daman Real Capital Partners Co. LLC v. Oger Dubai LLC, Cassation 1 of 2016

[vi] Dubai Waterfront LLC v. Liu, Cassation 2 of 2016

[vii] Endofa DMCC v. D’Amico Shipping, Cassation 4 of 2017

[viii] [31]-[32], Lakhan v Lamia [2021] DIFC CA 001 (8 April 2021)

[ix] [55], Tavira Securities Limited v Re Point Ventures FZCO & Ors [2017] CFI 026 (17 December 2017)

[x] Serene Resources DMCC v Energen DMCC (CJT 2/2025) (see [2], Schedule I)

[xi] Advanced Gulf General Trading Co LLC v Engineering Construction and Development Co LLC (CJT 3/2024) (see [14], Schedule I)

 [xii] See our paper titled ‘The Evolving Landscape of Freestanding Injunctions in the DIFC’ published for DAW 2025 (see here)

[xiii] Hannon International Middle East DMCC v Orlen Trading Swiss LLC (CJT 14/2024) (see [4], Schedule I)

[xiv] Rajen Shah v Skatteforvatningen (CJT 12/2024) (see [6], Schedule I)

[xv] Nael v Niamh Bank [2024] DIFC CA 015 (9 January 2025)

[xvi] Union Insurance Company PJSC v International Precious Metals Refiners LLC [2022] DIFC CFI 064 (12 May 2025)

[xvii] Union Insurance Company PJSC v International Precious Metals Refiners LLC [2022] DIFC CFI 064 (15 September 2023)

[xviii] Horizon Energy LLC v Al Buhaira National Insurance Company [2022] DIFC CA 015 (19 April 2023)

[xix] Investment Group Private Limited v Standard Chartered Bank [2015] DIFC CA 004 (19 November 2015)

[xx] Union Insurance Company PJSC v International Precious Metals Refiners LLC [2022] DIFC CFI 064 (26 June 2025)

[xxi] Ivankovich v KJM Marine [2024] DIFC CFI 068 (26 March 2025)

[xxii] NU Projects Technical Services LLC v Yahya Iqbal Ismail (CJT 13/2024) (see [5], Schedule I)

[xxiii] Neville v Nigel [2024] DIFC CFI ARB 006 (2 July 2024)

[xxiv] Valentyna Plewka Kolesnik v Emirates NBD Bank [2024] DIFC SCT 242 (31 October 2024)

[xxv] Atul Ashok Amir Chand Dhawan v Zurich International Life Limited [2025] DIFC CFI 019 (9 September 2025)