THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE OF FREESTANDING INJUNCTIONS IN THE DIFC

I. INTRODUCTION

  1. Over the years, the DIFC Courts have earned the repute of being both pro-arbitration as well as pro-enforcement. One of the many ways in which the DIFC Courts enjoy this reputation is the range of injunctive reliefs parties are permitted to seek in aid of enforcement. The DIFC’s injunction jurisdiction is vast and attractive for several international litigants.
  2. Singularity’s last insight preceding DAW 2024 examined the challenging implications of the DIFC Court of Appeal’s (“CA”) decision in Sandra Holding v Fawzi Musaed Al Saleh (“Sandra Holding”) which found that the DIFC Courts could not issue injunctions, specifically worldwide freezing orders (“WFOs”), in support of an anticipated foreign judgment without a demonstrated nexus to the DIFC.[i] Singularity had appropriately foreshadowed that if the DIFC Courts were to find Sandra Holding per incuriam, it would recast their wide jurisdictional net. Since Sandra Holding, the jurisprudential developments reflect a state of flux concerning the availability of freestanding injunctions in the DIFC.
  3. That shift came just three months later in Carmon v Cuenda (“Carmon”), where the CA overturned Sandra Holding and confirmed that the DIFC Courts had the jurisdiction and power to issue WFOs in support of pending foreign proceedings.[ii] The decision appeared to find statutory recognition in Law No. 2 of 2025 concerning the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts (“New JAL”), where Article 15 introduces an entirely independent jurisdictional basis for interim and precautionary measures, including those in aid of foreign proceedings or foreign-seated arbitrations. Yet, recently, in Trafigura v Gupta (“Trafigura”), when an applicant sought to rely on this very provision, the DIFC Court of First Instance (“CFI”) refused the injunction, on the basis that Article 15 of the New JAL required a direct link to the DIFC.[iii] The CA decisively set aside this order, preserving both the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction to grant injunctions in aid of enforcement as well as its conduit jurisdiction.
  4. This past year has been pivotal for the DIFC injunctive landscape. Although primarily in the context of freezing orders, the DIFC Courts have now resolved much of the confusion that arose from these developments. This insight traces the developments of the past year and clarifies the current scope of freestanding injunctions in the DIFC.

II. RESTRICTING FREESTANDING INJUNCTIONS IN SANDRA HOLDING

  1. Sandra Holding marked a significant departure from the DIFC Courts’ previously expansive approach to granting injunctions in support of foreign proceedings.[iv] For instance, in Lateef v Liela, the CFI granted interim relief in support of proceedings in New York, recognising that the DIFC Courts’ power to grant injunctions was not qualified by any clear and unequivocal restraints and that there was neither a need for the applicants to have maintained a cause of action in the DIFC nor a need for them to possess assets in the DIFC.[v] This reasoning was subsequently relied on in future decisions.[vi]
  2. The CA in Sandra Holding, however, rejected this reasoning and curtailed the DIFC Courts’ power to grant injunctive relief in the absence of a nexus to the DIFC.[vii] It held that the “any written law” gateway under Article V(A)(1)(e) of the Judicial Authority Law No. 12 of 2004 (“Old JAL”) was not engaged by Article 24 of the DIFC Court Law No. 10 of 2004 (“Old Court Law”) in the absence of a foreign judgment. The Court explained that Article 24 only conferred jurisdiction to ratify existing judgments, and nothing in the DIFC’s legislative framework provided any basis for injunctions in aid of anticipated foreign judgments.
  3. The CA observed that the CFI, in Lateef v Liela, had failed to address the absence of a relevant law engaging jurisdiction under the “any written law” gateway. The CA emphasised that the threshold question preceding any grant of injunctions was whether the DIFC Courts had statutory jurisdiction to issue any relief at all.
  4. Having clarified this jurisdictional limit, the CA further explained that, only after first establishing prima facie jurisdiction, might the DIFC Courts consider whether or not to exercise discretion to grant the injunction. The CA observed that where a defendant fell within neither the territorial nor the in personam jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts, an injunction extending to foreign assets might be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as, where there might be a real connecting link between the subject matter of the relief and the DIFC (typically through assets within jurisdiction), or where it was practical for such relief to be granted and effectively enforced.

III. RESURRECTING FREESTANDING INJUNCTIONS IN CARMON

  1. Three months after Sandra Holding, it was overruled by the CA in Carmon. The CA held that the correct inquiry in Sandra Holding should have been whether the DIFC Courts possessed the power and ancillary jurisdiction to issue a freezing order in respect of an anticipated foreign judgment so as to avoid their express jurisdiction to recognise and enforce foreign judgments from being thwarted.[viii]
  2. The CA reasoned that the DIFC Courts’ recognised jurisdiction to enter judgment in support of a foreign judgment necessarily entails the power to grant protective measures where there existed a risk that assets may be dissipated before the foreign judgment is issued. It concluded that the DIFC Courts possess both the jurisdiction and the power, under Articles 24 and 32 of the Old Court Law read with Article 7(6) of the Old JAL, to grant freezing orders in aid of pending proceedings in a foreign court whose judgment may then be amenable to recognition and execution in the DIFC. The CA emphasised that the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction would otherwise be frustrated if a judgment debtor could dissipate assets in anticipation of a judgment likely to be enforced in the DIFC.
  3. It followed that these provisions were engaged under the “any written law gateway” and did not require any separate “nexus” to the DIFC. The CA reiterated that whether a written law confers jurisdiction is a matter of construction, and that such jurisdiction may be construed and conferred, where absent any express grant of jurisdiction, the law would be rendered ineffective or left with a lacuna in its operation.
  4. However, it appears that the DIFC Courts have limited this freestanding jurisdiction to grant an injunction to provide relief to protect assets in support of anticipated enforcement. In Nashrah v Najem & Nex (“Nashrah”), the CFI granted an anti-suit injunction under its supportive jurisdiction relying on Article 32 of the Old Court Law, despite not finding, to the requisite threshold, that the DIFC was the seat of the arbitration.[ix] Relying on prior DIFC authority, the CFI found that the case presented unusual and exceptional circumstances justifying the exercise of its jurisdiction. On appeal, however, the CA overturned that decision. While the order is not yet publicly available as of the date of this publication, the CA found no freestanding jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction where the DIFC is not the seat of the arbitration and no other nexus to the DIFC exists. This indicates a limitation on the Courts’ injunctive powers beyond asset-preservation measures in aid of their enforcement jurisdiction.
  5. Nonetheless, Carmon reaffirmed the DIFC as a uniquely conducive jurisdiction for judgment creditors to seek enforcement of a judgment in its favour pending judgment in foreign proceedings. Indeed, as the DIFC CA succinctly summarised, where DIFC Courts find “their jurisdiction and powers are amenable to constructions supporting the rule of law in transnational trade and commerce, such constructions should be preferred.”[x] Not only did Carmon mark a long-lasting shift in DIFC jurisprudence, but it also appeared to find formal recognition in the DIFC legislative framework shortly thereafter.

IV. STATUTORY RECOGNITION IN THE NEW JAL

  1. In March 2025, the New JAL was enacted, replacing the Old JAL and the Old Court Law.[xi] Article 14 of the New JAL now sets out seven jurisdictional gateways for the DIFC Courts, replacing Article 5(A)(1) of the Old JAL. Notably, Article 14(7) preserves the familiar “any written law” gateway, ensuring continuity in the DIFC Courts’ jurisdictional framework. Article 19 of the New JAL complements Article 14 by delineating the specific matters falling within the jurisdiction of the CFI, subject to the jurisdictional gateways enumerated in Article 14.
  2. Importantly, the New JAL introduces Article 15, which appears to establish an independent basis for the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction to order interim or precautionary measures, including disclosure of the identity of potential defendants, and disclosure of assets or funds connected to claims within the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction. Unlike Article 19, Article 15 operates independently of jurisdictional gateways in Article 14.
  3. Of particular relevance is Article 15(4), which grants jurisdiction to the DIFC Courts to hear and determine applications for interim or precautionary measures related to “applications, claims or current or future arbitral proceedings brought outside the DIFC seeking suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC”. This provision appears to codify the reasoning in Carmon, providing express statutory recognition of the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in support of foreign proceedings or foreign-seated arbitrations. While Carmon concerned a freezing order in support of an anticipated foreign judgment, Article 15(4) is drafted in broader terms for all “suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC”. Its precise scope has since been interpreted and clarified by the CA, as discussed below.
  4. Additionally, Article 19(B)(3), subject to Article 14, explicitly recognises the jurisdiction of the CFI to grant injunctions either restraining conduct or compelling specific acts. Article 24(D)(2) and (3) further confirm the DIFC Courts’ power to make orders, including, but not limited to, injunctions and interim or interlocutory orders.
  5. Another notable development is Article 31(4), which empowers the newly designated Enforcement Judge to enforce foreign judgments and orders affixed with the executory formula, including interim and precautionary orders.[xii] This provides parties who have already obtained foreign WFOs with an alternative pathway: instead of seeking a fresh order under Article 15(4), they may also directly enforce the foreign freezing order before the DIFC Courts. The exact operation of this mechanism, however, remains to be tested.

V. COMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM TRAFIGURA

  1. Despite this seemingly straightforward development, the CFI adopted a differing interpretation of the New JAL in Trafigura.[xiii] In that case, the claimant creditors urged the CFI, at an ex parte hearing, to grant a UAE-wide freezing order together with ancillary disclosure orders against the defendants, both resident in onshore Dubai. The application was brought under Articles 14(7), 15, and 31(4) of the New JAL as a freestanding application for interim relief in support of foreign proceedings before the High Court of England and Wales. The English proceedings had already resulted in a WFO against one defendant, and a Chabra order against the other, a non-cause-of-action defendant who held substantial assets in Dubai. The claimants, therefore, sought relief from the DIFC Courts to preserve assets within the UAE pending the determination of the English proceedings.

(i) The ex parte decision: a nexus requirement for enforcement?

  1. The CFI accepted that the claimants had shown a good arguable case and sufficient urgency, given the high risk of dissipation of assets, warranting the grant of relief extending to assets outside the DIFC in line with established case law. However, the introduction of the New JAL raised an important question as to the Court’s jurisdiction to grant such relief over assets beyond its territorial boundaries. The determinative issue, therefore, concerned the proper application of the jurisdictional provisions of the New JAL.
  2. The CFI found that the application did not clarify whether it constituted (i) a fresh claim for interim relief under Article 14(A)(7) of the New JAL, or (ii) an application to enforce the English orders in the DIFC under Article 31 of the New JAL. It therefore considered both possibilities but rejected each, holding that the claimants had failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of either provision:
    1. First, in rejecting the characterisation of the application as a fresh claim under Article 14, the CFI noted that the jurisdictional gateways requiring a direct link had not been engaged. Because the orders sought were additional to, rather than a direct enforcement of, the existing foreign orders, Article 14(7) was not applicable as “no “international treaty” or “convention” has been engaged”.
    2. Second, assuming the application sought to enforce the English orders under Article 31, the CFI observed that Article 31 of the New JAL introduced a new administration of enforcement requiring the existence of an asset (or something akin to an asset) within the DIFC at the time enforcement was sought. This, it held, was distinct from the old regime, which had permitted the DIFC to operate as a conduit jurisdiction. Case law arising under the old regime, such as Carmon, should therefore not be relied upon in interpreting the New JAL.
  3. The CFI concluded that Articles 14 and 31 of the New JAL plainly require a direct link to the DIFC for the Court to hear a fresh claim or enforce a foreign judgment. Notably, it did not address Article 15 of the New JAL, which expressly confers on the DIFC Courts jurisdiction to order interim or precautionary measures.
  4. This decision marked a significant and unexpected departure from established DIFC authority, creating uncertainty among litigants and practitioners not only as to the scope of the DIFC Courts’ injunctive powers under the New JAL, but also as to their fundamental role as a conduit enforcement jurisdiction. The CFI’s interpretation of Article 31 appeared not to be confined to interim or precautionary measures but to extend to all instruments previously capable of enforcement under the old regime, thereby casting doubt on the continued availability of the DIFC as a conduit jurisdiction for recognition and enforcement.
  5. Given the significance of its interpretation of the New JAL, the CFI, in a separate order, granted the claimants permission to appeal on two grounds: first, that it lacked jurisdiction; and second, that it erred in finding that the enforcement of foreign judgments in DIFC required a link to the DIFC.[xiv]
  6. The appeal from the CFI’s ex parte decision brought much-needed clarity, albeit temporarily, to a legal community left uneasy by the CFI’s restrictive interpretation. On appeal, the CA set aside the CFI’s order and issued its own ex parte freezing order together with the ancillary relief originally sought.[xv]  It did so on the basis that there was at least a reasonably arguable case for the existence of jurisdiction under the New JAL, which, coupled with the CFI’s earlier finding of a reasonably arguable case on the merits, warranted the grant of the interim relief sought.
  7. The CA emphasised, however, that given the appeal was heard ex parte, it would not make a final determination on jurisdiction. It confined itself to holding that the existence of the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction and powers to grant the interim orders was strongly arguable, observing that it would be “surprising” if the New JAL had the effect of contracting those powers. The appeal was accordingly allowed on the second ground, i.e. that the CFI ought to have held that a sufficiently arguable case for jurisdiction and power existed to justify the relief sought; while the first ground, concerning the actual existence of jurisdiction, was adjourned to allow the respondents, if they so wished, to contest it at a return hearing before the CA.
  8. For practitioners, this came as a welcome reprieve – the immediate reinstatement of the freezing order suggested that the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction to issue injunctions in support of foreign proceedings remained intact, at least on an arguable basis. Yet the question of jurisdiction was far from settled. With the issue formally adjourned to the return date, the judgment left parties, and the wider enforcement community, waiting keenly for the CA’s definitive ruling on whether the New JAL and Article 15(4) indeed provided a freestanding basis for such relief, and for guidance on the interplay with the Court’s enforcement jurisdiction under Article 31.

(ii) The return date: clarity restored

  1. On the return date, the CA upheld the Court’s jurisdiction to grant freestanding injunctions. The central question before the CA was whether the CFI could issue a freezing order against a defendant in foreign proceedings which may yield a judgment enforceable in the UAE. As this issue directly engaged the CFI’s jurisdiction to grant interim or precautionary measures under Article 15 of the New JAL, the CA focused on the proper construction of that provision, noting that the CFI had not addressed it in its decision.
  2. The respondents’ challenge turned on the interpretation of the phrase “suitable precautionary measures [are taken] within the DIFC” as contained in Article 15(4).[xvi] They contended that the Arabic translation introduced a conditional operator “provided that” before this phrase, which in their view imposed a substantive territorial requirement – that any precautionary measures sought under Article 15(4) must necessarily be capable of operating on assets, entities or interests within the DIFC.
  3. The claimants, on the contrary, submitted that Article 15(4) was intended to codify the position in Carmon and confer an independent statutory basis for precautionary measures in support of foreign proceedings. They argued that the expression “within the DIFC” referred not to the situs of the assets but to the seat of the court exercising jurisdiction, and that even if the Arabic text contained “provided that”, the phrase operated only as a connective, not as a limitation. They reiterated that Article 15 makes no reference to any required nexus to assets within the DIFC. They further compared the operative similarities between Article 7(6) of the Old JAL (for the execution of judgments) and Article 15(4) of the New JAL, which both employ the phrase “within the DIFC”, noting that the former did not impose any territorial requirement for the enforcement or execution within the DIFC.
  4. The CA agreed. As a starting point, it confirmed that nothing in the New JAL affects the correctness of the position in Carmon. It held that Article 15(4), read with its chapeau of Article 15, completely conferred upon the DIFC Courts the jurisdiction to authorise the precautionary measures contemplated by that provision. It noted that Article 15(4) will cover applications brought in the DIFC Courts related to foreign proceedings, and its controlling words were “suitable precautionary measures (are taken) within the DIFC”. Even adopting the respondents’ translation, the use of “provided that” was merely as a connecting term and not intended to limit the subject matter of the controlling phrase of Article 15(4). The CA described it as “surprising in the extreme” if so minor a linguistic choice could be taken to substantially narrow the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction and powers to grant precautionary measures
  5. In doing so, the CA reaffirmed that this interpretation was consistent with Carmon and the Court’s established powers under RDC Part 25, including freezing orders extending to assets whether located within the DIFC or not. These powers, the Court emphasised, exist to prevent the frustration of its jurisdiction by debtors who might otherwise dissipate assets ahead of an anticipated foreign judgment capable of recognition or enforcement in the DIFC. The New JAL, properly construed, preserves this jurisdiction rather than contracts it.
  6. Referring to Article 32 of the New JAL, the CA highlighted the relationship between the DIFC and the UAE courts and emphasised that the preservation of the “conduit jurisdiction” was not merely a matter of precedent but of public policy. Reiterating the principle affirmed in Carmon, the CA noted that narrowing jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the legislative intent underpinning the establishment of the DIFC Courts and with the wider policy of supporting transnational enforcement and the rule of law in international commerce. To that end, the CA dismissed any suggestion that issues of forum shopping or comity may arise, observing that these relate to the exercise of discretion, and not the existence of jurisdiction.

VI. CONCLUSION 

  1. The trajectory from Sandra Holding to Trafigura marks a decisive reaffirmation of the DIFC Courts’ expansive injunctive and enforcement jurisdiction. Where Sandra Holding momentarily curtailed that authority, Carmon restored it, and Trafigura has now grounded it in statute under the New JAL. It re-establishes that the DIFC Courts retain a freestanding jurisdiction to grant freezing orders in support of foreign proceedings under Article 15(4) of the New JAL, without requiring a territorial nexus to the DIFC. The CA’s reasoning reaffirms the DIFC’s role as a conduit jurisdiction and the policy imperative of facilitating, rather than constraining, cross-border enforcement within Dubai’s judicial framework. In doing so, it preserves the DIFC’s standing as a modern, pro-enforcement forum aligned with the rule of law in international commerce.
  2. Very recently, the DIFC Digital Economy Court (“DEC”) also issued its first WFO in unpublished Techteryx Ltd v Aria Commodities DMCC under Article 15(4) of the New JAL.[xvii] The DEC confirmed the continuation of a proprietary injunction and a WFO against the defendant in respect of reserves backing a U.S.-dollar pegged stablecoin. Although those reserves were custodied in Hong Kong and purportedly invested through a Cayman Islands-based fund, approximately US$ 456 million appeared to have been remitted directly to the defendant in onshore Dubai instead of the Cayman fund. Echoing the CA in Trafigura, the DEC clarified that Article 15(4) does not confer a freestanding jurisdiction; rather, it provides a firm statutory foundation for the position in Carmon that such relief may be granted where the foreign judgment is potentially enforceable in the DIFC. The DEC is understood to have explained that the jurisdiction operates as a matter of comity so that foreign judgments are not thwarted by pre-emptive dissipation, reasoning that was central to Carmon. The DEC reportedly held that digital assets restrained under such orders must be amenable to satisfaction through enforcement mechanisms available in the DIFC.
  3. Trafigura and Techtryx appear to confine the DIFC Courts’ freestanding jurisdiction under Article 15(4) to granting asset-preservation measures in support of foreign proceedings and foreign-seated arbitrations. The CA’s decision in Nashrah, although decided under the Old JAL, expressly refers to Trafigura and signals judicial hesitation to extend freestanding jurisdiction beyond asset-preservation measures ancillary to the Court’s enforcement jurisdiction. That said, it may be arguable that the broad reference to “suitable precautionary measures” in Article 15(4) ought to be able to encompass other equitable remedies where such relief would protect the integrity of an anticipated award or judgment enforceable within the DIFC. For instance, an anti-suit injunction restraining proceedings in breach of a valid arbitration agreement (even if non-DIFC-seated) could arguably fall within its scope. Whether that jurisdiction would be exercised, as Carmon explains, remains a matter of discretion. While Nashrah currently forecloses this interpretation, its reasoning may yet invite reconsideration.
  4. Ultimately, Trafigura consolidates the DIFC Courts’ position as a leading transnational enforcement forum – one that combines flexibility with judicial discipline. While it restores confidence in the DIFC Courts’ supportive jurisdiction, it also signals a shift toward a more integrated, statute-based enforcement framework under the New JAL. While the contours of its injunctive jurisdiction will continue to evolve, the Court’s purposive interpretation of the New JAL ensures that the DIFC remains responsive to the realities of international commerce while grounded in principled restraint. The challenge ahead lies in defining how far that framework can extend – without undermining the balance between the Court’s statutory mandate and judicial restraint that underpins the DIFC’s legitimacy.

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[i] Sandra Holding Ltd v Fawzi Musaed Al Saleh [2023] DIFC CA 003 (6 September 2023); Last year, Singularity examined the impact of Sandra Holding (see here).

[ii] Carmon Reestrutura-engenharia E Serviços Técnios Especiais, (Su) LDA v Antonio Joao Catete Lopes Cuenda [2024] DIFC CA 003 (26 November 2024); We further examined the CA’s decision in Carmon in a brief case alert (see here).

[iii] The ex parte decisions were initially published in anonymised form as Nadil v Nameer, and were later unanonymised following the return date before the CA as Trafigura Pte Ltd & Trafigura India Pte Ltd v Prateek Gupta & Ginni Gupta [2025] DIFC CA 001 (22 September 2025).

[iv] Singularity has also published a brief case alert on Sandra Holding (see here).

[v] [72], [121]-[123], [127], Lateef v Liela [2020] DIFC ARB 017 (13 December 2021)

[vi] Jones v Jones [2022] DIFC CFI 043 (12 September 2022); Globe Investment Holding Ltd v Commercial Bank of Dubai [2023] DIFC CFI 028 (4 July 2023)

[vii] [54], Sandra Holding Ltd v Fawzi Musaed Al Saleh [2023] DIFC CA 003 (6 September 2023)

[viii] Please see [30]-[32] of our case alert examining the impact of Carmon, published last year (see here).

[ix] Nashrah v Najem & Nex [2025] DIFC ARB 005 (5 February 2025). Singularity represented the claimant/respondent in these proceedings.

[x] [155], Carmon Reestrutura-engenharia E Serviços Técnios Especiais, (Su) LDA v Antonio Joao Catete Lopes Cuenda [2024] DIFC CA 003 (26 November 2024)

[xi] We provide a detailed examination of the New JAL in our paper titled “JAL 2.0: The DIFC Courts’ Reboot” published for DAW 2025 (see here).

[xii] Please see [9]-[10] of our paper titled “JAL 2.0: The DIFC Courts’ Reboot” published for DAW 2025 (see here).

[xiii] Nadil v Nameer [2025] DIFC CFI (1 April 2025)

[xiv] Nadil and Noshaba v Nameer and Naseema [2025] DIFC CFI (2 April 2025)

[xv] Nadil and Noshaba v Nameer and Naseema [2025] DIFC CA (26 April 2025); Nadil and Noshaba v Nameer and Naseema [2025] DIFC CA (13 June 2025)

[xvi] The Arabic text includes the words “are taken”, which are absent from the official English translation, although nothing in the appeal turned on this linguistic variation.

[xvii] The decision remains unpublished as of the date of this paper. However, brief details are available in law firm and practitioner updates (see here and here). 

[xviii] In the context of anti-suit injunctions in support of non-DIFC-seated arbitrations, precedent indicates that such relief will only be granted in “unusual and exceptional circumstances. See Ledger v Leeor CA-013-2022 (26 October 2022); Brookfield Multiplex Constructions LLC v DIFC Investments LLC and Dubai International Financial Centre Authority CFI-020-2016 (28 July 2016); Narciso v Nash ARB-009-2024 (20 June 20124); Hayri International LLC v Hazim Telecom Private Ltd [2016] DIFC-ARB-010 (28 February 2017).