Portugal: A White-Collar Crime Overview

According to the Bank of Portugal’s projections published in October 2025, economic activity in Portugal is expected to continue to grow at a moderate pace in 2026 (growth of around 2.2%) and 2027 (growth of around 1.7%).

On 20 June 2024, the Portuguese government published the Anti-Corruption Agenda, a comprehensive set of measures aimed at strengthening the fight against corruption and corruption-related crimes, while also seeking to improve Portugal’s standing in international transparency indicators. According to the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, published by Transparency International, Portugal ranked 46th, with 56 points out of a possible 100, remaining below the European Union average in terms of perceived transparency, institutional reliability and quality of public administration.

In a press release dated 10 February 2026, the Ministry of Justice reported that the Anti-Corruption Agenda comprises 42 measures, primarily focused on the prevention and repression of corruption. The majority of these measures are currently under implementation, several are in an advanced stage, and 17 have already been completed. Among the measures already adopted, particular attention should be paid to Law No 5-A/2026, of 28 January 2026, which establishes a transparency framework applicable to private entities, both national and foreign, that legitimately represent interests before public entities, and creates the Transparency Register for Interest Representation (RTRI). This regime introduces a regulated lobbying framework in Portugal and will enter into force on 27 July 2026, following a 180‑day vacatio legis.

The law recognises a set of rights for lobbyists, including the right to contact public authorities for the purpose of legitimate interest representation, access to public buildings in that context, and access to information regarding ongoing public consultations of a legislative or regulatory nature.

At the same time, it imposes extensive transparency obligations for lobbyists. These include, inter alia, the obligation to keep the registered information permanently up to date, to identify themselves as registered interest representatives (including their registration number) when contacting public bodies, to ensure that all parliamentary political forces have access to information relevant to the exercise of interest representation, and to guarantee the completeness and accuracy of all information disclosed under the statute. Registered entities must also maintain detailed records of all interactions carried out in the context of interest representation, which may be requested by the public bodies concerned.

Public entities are likewise subject to reinforced transparency obligations, notably the mandatory quarterly disclosure of meetings held with entities registered in the Transparency Register for Interest Representation (RTRI) and their respective purposes, the publication of ongoing public consultations on their official website, and the identification, at the conclusion of the legislative procedure, of all consultations and interactions carried out during the preparatory phase, under the newly created Legislative Footprint Mechanism.

From a sanctioning standpoint, the statute expressly provides that the irregular exercise of interest representation or non-compliance with legally imposed duties may give rise to enforcement action on two levels. Administratively, the management body of the RTRI (to be appointed by the Portuguese Parliament) may initiate investigations and impose sanctions for a maximum period of two years, including the total or partial suspension of registration or institutional contacts, restrictions on access by individuals involved in interest representation, and exclusion from public consultation procedures. Criminally, the relevant facts may be reported to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, potentially giving rise to investigations for offences such as influence peddling (Article 335 of the Penal Code) and false statements (Article 348-A of the Penal Code).

Another key development is the approval, on 11 December 2025, by the Portuguese Parliament, of Bill of Law No 50/XVII/1, which transposes Directive (EU) No 2024/1260 on the recovery and forfeiture of assets. This legislative initiative intends to strengthen the Portuguese legal framework on confiscation of assets derived from criminal activity and introduces a new regime of extended confiscation in favour of the State. The bill is still subject to discussion in the speciality stage prior to final approval. The proposed regime provides for three particularly significant mechanisms:

• extended confiscation where there is strong evidence of a criminal origin of assets, even in the absence of direct proof;
• forfeiture linked to criminal activity generating substantial benefit, even without a criminal conviction; and
• forfeiture in cases where criminal proceedings are terminated (due to death, escape or statute of limitations), through autonomous proceedings, subject to limitation periods of 10 or 15 years.

These mechanisms may represent a substantial expansion of the State’s powers in asset recovery and raise complex issues concerning evidentiary standards, procedural safeguards and constitutional protections, with direct implications for criminal defence practice.

In parallel with domestic initiatives, the Council of the European Union has published a Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating corruption, seeking to further harmonise certain aspects of criminal law across member states.

The proposal seeks to ensure the uniform criminalisation, throughout the European Union, of a broad range of corruption‑related offences, including bribery in both the public and private sectors, embezzlement, influence peddling, obstruction of justice, illicit enrichment derived from corruption offences, concealment, and certain serious breaches of duty committed in the exercise of public functions.

From a sanctions perspective, the proposal significantly raises the level of criminal exposure for individuals, providing for an increase in maximum prison sentences from at least three years to at least five years, depending on the offence. It also expressly allows for the imposition of ancillary penalties, such as disqualification from holding public office or performing public service functions, revocation of licences, and exclusion from public procurement procedures and access to public funds.

Legal persons are likewise placed under a reinforced liability framework. The proposal establishes the possibility of imposing substantial financial penalties, with maximum fines set either at between 3% and 5% of total worldwide turnover, or at fixed amounts ranging from EUR24 million to EUR40 million, depending on the offence concerned. These thresholds reflect a clear trend towards enhanced corporate criminal liability and increased deterrence at European Union level.

The year 2026 and the following years are expected to be particularly demanding in the field of corruption prevention and repression in Portugal. Increased activity by the Portuguese Corruption Prevention Mechanism in the area of administrative offences, combined with a foreseeable rise in complex criminal investigations, is likely to contribute to the development of innovative and challenging case law in corruption‑related matters, reinforcing the importance of specialised criminal defence and compliance advisory work.