Brazil: A Competition/Antitrust Overview
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CADE Enforcement in 2025 and Future Competition Trends
Introduction
Brazilian antitrust policy in recent years has been characterised by continuity in enforcement activity, consolidation of its institutional role in the global competition landscape, and growing analytical sophistication within the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE).
In 2025, CADE reviewed 849 merger control cases. The aggregate value of transactions filed with CADE in 2025 is estimated at approximately BRL1.3 trillion (USD245.5 billion).
On the conduct enforcement agenda, the CADE Tribunal ruled on 24 investigations, including 16 cartel cases, as well as four dominance/unilateral cases. The fines imposed amounted to approximately BRL280 million (USD53 million). In parallel, the General Superintendence initiated 90 new investigations, indicating a robust enforcement pipeline.
Beyond these quantitative indicators, 2025 also reflected increased scrutiny in investigations involving concerted practices, as well as vertical restraints in digital markets.
Merger control
Most transactions (approximately 95%) are reviewed under the Fast-Track Procedure and, in 2025, the average clearance time for these cases remained slightly above two weeks, while the Non-Fast-Track cases were concluded, on average, within four months. This level of procedural efficiency remains one of the most predictable features of the Brazilian merger control regime.
CADE also maintained a rigorous approach toward transactions implemented without prior notification. During 2025, the CADE Tribunal ruled on ten gun jumping cases, while the General Superintendence opened eleven new investigations. The most notable discussions concerned the creation of two football leagues (LFU and Libra) by Brazilian clubs to commercialise broadcasting rights. In these cases, the Authority determined that the formation of such leagues, as well as the admission of additional clubs, should constitute transactions subject to CADE’s mandatory merger control.
While unconditional approvals remain the predominant outcome, 2025 saw the return of structural remedies in relevant cases, alongside traditional behavioural commitments. The Petz/Cobasi Merger raised extensive debate regarding competitive dynamics between online and store-based retail channels in pet products, but was cleared subject to the divestiture of several physical stores. Similarly, in Bimbo’s acquisition of rival bread maker Wickbold, CADE required brand divestiture combined with behavioural commitments mainly related to distribution and logistics before they reach retail channels. In the telecommunications sector, the Authority limited the structural scope of a transaction involving Telefônica and TIM by preventing the companies from sharing mobile telecommunications infrastructure in several Brazilian locations due to co-ordination risks in an already highly concentrated market.
In a separate consultation involving the Carrefour Group, the CADE Tribunal clarified that the mere transfer of non-operational assets, buildings and/or land between non-competing groups does not require, as a rule, mandatory filing with CADE. This understanding does not extend to transactions between real estate sector companies, which remain subject to mandatory notification when the turnover thresholds are met. As a result, the real estate sector continues to rank among those with the highest number of merger filings before CADE, alongside the electricity sector.
Conduct enforcement
Conduct enforcement in 2025 combined traditional cartel prosecution with heightened scrutiny of practices capable of inducing uniform commercial conduct, and of vertical restraints in digital markets.
In addition to the cases decided and initiated as mentioned above, the Authority continued to strengthen its use of consensual tools. Accordingly, 2025 saw a record number of 77 cease-and-desist agreements (TCCs), underscoring the central role of negotiated solutions in CADE’s conduct enforcement framework.
Enforcement in labour markets was intensified, with relevant developments in investigations involving exchanges of competitively sensitive information in human resources contexts. In this context, TCCs were entered into with 3M, Bayer, Dow, General Mills, IBM and Monsanto. CADE also formalised a technical co-operation agreement with the Brazilian Labour Prosecutor’s Office (MPT), signalling concerns regarding wage-fixing and no-poach misconduct.
In classic cartel enforcement, the most significant fines imposed included approximately BRL73 million (USD13.8 million) in the “Electricity Meters Case” and more than BRL150 million (USD28.3 million) in the – “Fuel Resale Case”, in the Federal District where CADE’s headquarters are located
Beyond hard-core cartels, the Authority devoted significant attention to practices capable of inducing uniform commercial conduct, particularly through trade associations’ price tables/signalling, and exchanges of competitively sensitive information.
One of the most high-profile matters involved the “Soy Moratorium Case”, an environmental governance arrangement under which soy traders committed not to acquire soy produced in deforested areas. The case raised complex discussions on the intersection of antitrust and sustainability, and the interim measure imposed by CADE was ultimately analysed by the Brazilian Supreme Court. This leading and paradigmatic case places Brazil within the broader international debate on sustainability co-operation agreements and the conditions under which environmental initiatives may be reconciled with competition law.
Vertical pricing restraints likewise remained under scrutiny. In a consultation on minimum advertised price (MAP) policies, the CADE Tribunal highlighted its concerns regarding pricing-related vertical restraints, indicating that even MAP policies may, in specific circumstances, be presumed unlawful by object.
Digital markets remained a central enforcement priority. Investigations involving Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft and Uber were either opened or subjected to deeper scrutiny, with interim measures imposed in some cases. The Authority also promoted public consultations and hearings to discuss competition issues related to Apple’s iOS ecosystem and Google’s activities in online search and news markets. In the cases concerning Apple’s App Store and Google’s Android, CADE entered into TCCs with Apple and Google, respectively.
CADE made notable use of interim measures in 2025, particularly in fast-moving or sensitive markets, such as digital markets and in the Soy Moratorium Case. In an investigation related to the new WhatsApp terms applicable to artificial intelligence providers, the General Superintendence imposed interim measures against Meta only two months after the formal filing of the complaint, taking the lead in a discussion that is already under scrutiny in other jurisdictions.
What lies ahead
Several structural trends are likely to shape Brazil’s competition landscape in 2026.
Bill 4,675/2025 proposes the introduction of an ex ante regulatory regime for systemically relevant digital platforms – ie, “gatekeepers” – establishing objective designation criteria and creating a Digital Markets Superintendence within CADE. Designated platforms could be subject to additional obligations, including data portability, interoperability, and transparency requirements, as well as mandatory merger notification.
Another bill (4,612/2025) proposes removing CADE’s authority to impose sanctions on individuals in cartel cases, limiting penalties to corporations and reviving the debate over deterrence and individual accountability.
Despite the pending urgency requests for legislative deliberation, Brazil’s 2026 elections may ultimately influence the timing of debate and approval of these bills.
Inside CADE, 2026 is expected to be a year of significant institutional transition, as the mandates of the General Superintendent and several Commissioners will come to an end. These vacancies will provide the Federal Government with an opportunity to reshape the Authority’s technical composition. The key challenge will be to ensure a smooth transition that preserves CADE’s reputation for analytical sophistication and procedural efficiency. As the new leadership takes shape, CADE will need to maintain institutional stability and legal certainty while navigating the complexities of digital transformation, sustainability-driven co-operation, and an environment of increasing judicial and legislative scrutiny.

