China: A Restructuring/Insolvency (PRC Firms) Overview

Trustee-Based Debt Crisis Resolution: Practicality and Necessity in the Complex Debt Restructuring of Chinese Private Enterprises

Structural characteristics of debt risks in distressed private enterprises

In recent years, profound adjustments in China’s economic structure have reshaped the trajectory of large private enterprises. The severe contraction of the real estate sector, the after-effects of cross-industry diversification, the sudden decline in risk appetite among financial institutions, and the sustained tightening of financing conditions for private enterprises have collectively triggered a broad and deep liquidity crisis. For many large, previously diversified private groups, the emergence of a debt crisis is rarely an isolated event but rather the result of a “dual pressure” from external market changes and internal governance fatigue. Most enterprises shift from rapid expansion to systemic imbalance within a very short period, ultimately falling into comprehensive default.

The uniqueness of this round of private enterprise crises lies in the fact that, after falling into distress, many enterprises do not immediately lose asset value but instead rapidly lose operational capacity; their debts are not entirely irredeemable, yet the overly intertwined debt structures make solutions difficult to initiate; and although legal tools exist, the overlapping regulatory, judicial and criminal procedures prevent any single process from proceeding smoothly. In practice, what truly hinders the restructuring process is not a lack of tools but the enterprise itself descending into an “ungovernable” state.

It is against this backdrop that the tool of “trustee-based debt resolution” has emerged as a central focus in China’s debt restructuring practices. Unlike bankruptcy procedures and market-driven restructuring, trustee-based debt resolution has not yet developed a fixed model, nor does it operate as an extension of a single legal system. Instead, it operates as a “midfield mechanism” for restoring order amid complex governance deadlocks. Its significance does not lie in replacing existing systems but in providing a feasible path to restore governance and preserve value for large, complex enterprises when the original systems “cannot be activated”.

Trustee mechanisms amid governance breakdown: restoring enterprise “governability”

Current trustee arrangements in distressed enterprise cases almost invariably point to the same reality: enterprise failure is driven less by asset depletion and more by the complete breakdown of governance structures under crisis pressure. Assets and projects that should be operating normally are scattered across different regions, subsidiaries and ownership structures, and are often subject to freezes, seizures and controls imposed by judicial authorities, public security agencies, regulatory bodies and various creditors. Decision-making mechanisms fail, management teams lack unified directives, financial systems fail to accurately reflect operational conditions, and even “who has the authority to decide what” becomes unclear. In this state, whether introducing investors, advancing restructuring plans or initiating bankruptcy procedures, no process can proceed smoothly. The enterprise essentially exists in a vacuum where no one can assume responsibility, take over or conduct comprehensive investigations.

The institutional significance of trustee-based debt resolution lies precisely in its ability to fill this governance vacuum. By introducing market entities with industry expertise, public credibility and governance experience, such as large central or state-owned enterprises, to exercise management rights on behalf of the debtor for an agreed period, trusteeship can quickly restore the enterprise’s governability, transitioning it from chaos to a state where it can be audited, assessed and effectively operated. During the trusteeship period, the debtor retains ownership of its assets, equity structure and legal liabilities, while operational management rights are transferred to the trustee under a contractual framework. This arrangement prevents the excessive intervention of administrative takeovers and circumvents the deadlock of unenforceable bankruptcy procedures, ultimately enabling the enterprise to “become operational again”.

The operational impact of the trusteeship model is particularly significant. As suppliers, customers and partners witness competent institutions assuming unified control, projects resuming construction, accounts being restructured and operational teams regaining stability, the enterprise’s assets, which were rapidly depreciating due to chaos, can stabilise and recover. The core value of many groups lies not in the assets themselves but in their systemic value – such as supply chain synergies, regional ecosystems, brand resources, team capabilities and customer systems. Once operations cease, these values rapidly erode, but trusteeship helps preserve them amid short-term chaos.

Transparency restoration and interest restructuring: the institutional effects of trusteeship

Trusteeship often restores information transparency within the enterprise, enabling the previously distorted state of assets and liabilities to be presented accurately. A major challenge for many large groups during crises is the internal commingling of accounts, complex related-party transaction chains, overlapping mortgages and pledges, overlapping regulatory and judicial measures, and severely distorted financial statements. Upon intervention, the trustee team can independently restructure the financial system, clarify asset boundaries, verify guarantee chains, co-ordinate conflicts among different judicial and regulatory measures, and restore the enterprise’s foundational conditions for restructuring or attracting investors.

The value of the trusteeship model also lies in creating a structured space for “renewed dialogue” among different stakeholders. Distressed enterprises typically have numerous creditors organised in complex hierarchies, including ordinary creditors, licensed institutions, suppliers, homebuyers and small investors, each with distinct interests and demands. When an enterprise descends into chaos, effective negotiations among these parties become impossible: there is no consolidated financial data, no unified operational team, and no credible representative to propose solutions on behalf of the enterprise. Trusteeship creates a “negotiable centre”, enabling creditors to reassess their repayment expectations based on accurate information.

It should be underscored that trustee-based debt resolution is neither a substitute for bankruptcy procedures, nor a legal “suspension of execution”. Trusteeship is not intended to evade debt or delay procedures but to function as a governance tool that restores an enterprise’s management capabilities, revives asset liquidity and enables renewed interest negotiations. In many cases, trusteeship lays the foundation for enterprises to eventually enter formal restructuring, reach debt resolution agreements, or even reintroduce social capital. Trusteeship is not the end goal but a preliminary stage – an intermediate bridge facilitating the transition from “ungovernable” to “legally manageable”.

International comparisons and future prospects: trusteeship as a pre-restructuring mechanism for large enterprises

From an international perspective, governance crises in large and complex enterprises are often difficult to resolve through a single legal procedure. The US Chapter 11 prioritises “going-concern value” over liquidation value, with courts relying on debtor-in-possession mechanisms to restore enterprise governance. Europe’s pre-restructuring systems emphasise maintaining operational continuity through interim governance measures before judicial intervention. Similarly, Japan’s Civil Rehabilitation Law emphasises uninterrupted operations, with supervisors ensuring enterprises continue operating within a transparent framework. Although China’s trustee-based debt resolution is not a statutory procedure, its institutional logic closely aligns with these systems: when assets are overly complex, interests too diverse and procedures difficult to initiate, interim governance mechanisms restore order and create conditions necessary for formal restructuring.

Therefore, trustee-based debt resolution is neither a substitute for the bankruptcy system nor a universal solution. Instead, it serves as a “preliminary governance tool” in situations of governance disorder and procedural obstacles. It is particularly suited to large private groups with extensive scale, dispersed assets, complex ownership structures, broad social impact and certain recovery value. For these enterprises, bankruptcy liquidation fails to preserve value, restructuring procedures stall due to governance breakdown, and market-driven transactions are impeded by information opacity and ownership risks. Trusteeship offers these enterprises an opportunity to restore operational capabilities, facilitating a transition from governance deadlock to an institutionalised restructuring path.

As China’s debt restructuring system continues to evolve, trustee-based debt resolution is transitioning from an “emergency mechanism” to a viable option for restructuring large and complex enterprises. In cases of severe governance breakdown, extreme opacity of financial information and significant obstacles to implementing legal procedures, trusteeship offers a non-confrontational governance solution. It enables enterprises to restore order amid chaos, preserve value during crises, and ultimately progress towards effective restructuring and recovery.

托管式化解债务危机：在中国民营企业复杂债务重组实践中的现实性与必要性

困境民营企业债务风险的结构性特征

中国经济结构的深度调整正在重塑大型民营企业的命运轨迹。房地产行业的深度收缩、跨行业多元化扩张的后遗症、金融机构的风险偏好骤降，以及民营企业融资环境的持续收紧，共同构成了一场广泛而深刻的流动性危机。对许多曾经规模庞大、业务多元的民营集团而言，债务危机的爆发往往不是单点事件，而是来自外部市场变化和内部治理疲劳的“双重挤压”。多数企业都在极短时间内从高速扩张转入系统性失衡，最终陷入全面违约。

这一轮民营企业危机的特殊性在于：许多企业跌入困境后，其资产并非立即丧失价值，但企业却迅速失去经营能力；债务并非完全无可化解，但债务结构过于交织，使化解方案难以启动；法律工具并非缺位，但各种监管、司法和刑事程序的叠加，使得单一程序无法顺畅推进。在现实操作层面，真正阻碍重组进程的并不是工具的缺乏，而是企业本身已处于一种“无法治理”的状态。

在这样的背景下，“托管式化债”开始进入中国债务重组实践的中心视野。相较于破产程序和市场化重组，托管式化债尚未形成固定范式，也不是单一法律制度的延伸，而更像是一种在复杂治理僵局中重建秩序的“中场机制”。它的意义并非在于替代已有制度，而是在原有制度“无法被启动”时，为大型复杂企业的治理恢复和价值保全提供一条可行路径。

治理断裂下的托管机制：重建企业“可治理性”

如今困境企业的案例，大部分都是这样一个状态：企业的失败，很大程度上不是因为资产枯竭，而是因为治理结构在危机压力下全面断裂。本应正常经营的资产与项目被分散在不同地域、不同子公司和不同权属结构之中，受到来自司法机关、公安机关、监管部门和多家债权人的多重查封、冻结和控制。企业决策机制失灵，管理团队缺乏统一指令，财务系统无法真实反映经营状况，甚至连“谁有权决定什么”都无法明确。在这种状态下，无论是引入投资人、推动重整方案、还是启动破产程序，均无法顺利开展。

托管式化债的制度意义，恰恰在于解决这一治理真空。通过引入具备行业能力、公信力与治理经验的市场主体，例如大型央企或国企，由其在约定时间内代表债务人行使管理权，托管可以迅速恢复企业的可治理性，使其从混乱状态回到可被审计、可被评估、可被经营的状态。在托管期间，债务人的资产所有权、股权结构及法律责任均不发生变化，而经营管理权在合同框架下交由托管主体行使。这种安排避免了行政接管的过度干预，也规避了破产程序无法落地的僵局，使企业终于能“重新被运转起来”。

托管模式在经营层面的效果尤为显著。当供应商、客户、合作方看到有实力的机构开始统一接管，项目得以恢复施工，账目得以重整，运营团队重新获得稳定预期时，企业原本因混乱而迅速贬值的资产就能够止跌企稳。许多集团的关键价值不在资产本身，而在系统价值 - 供应链协同、区域生态、品牌资源、团队能力、客户体系 - 一旦停止运营，这些价值将迅速消失，而托管能确保这些价值不至于因短期混乱而流失。

透明度重建与利益重构：托管的制度效应

托管往往能重建企业信息透明度，使长期失真的资产负债状况得以重新呈现。许多大型集团在危机前后的最大问题就在于：内部账户混用、关联交易链条复杂、抵押质押交错不清、监管和司法措施重叠、财务报表严重失真。托管团队介入后，能够在相对独立的基础上重整财务系统，厘清资产边界，核查担保链条，协调不同司法与监管机关的措施冲突，使企业重新具备进入重整或引入投资人的基础条件。

托管模式的价值还在于，它为不同利益主体之间的“重新对话”提供了结构化的空间。困境企业的债权人往往数量庞大、层级复杂，有普通债权人、有持牌机构、有供应商、有小额投资者，利益诉求完全不同。在企业陷入混乱状态时，各方往往无法进行有效协商：没有统一财务数据，没有统一操作团队，也没有任何人能够代表企业提出可信方案。而托管创造了一个“可谈判的中心”，使债权人能够基于真实的信息重新评估受偿预期。

需要强调的是，托管式化债并非破产程序的替代，也不构成法律意义上的“暂停执行”。托管不是为了逃避债务，也不是为了延缓程序，而是一种让企业恢复治理能力、让资产恢复流动性、让利益协商重新具备可能性的治理手段。托管不是终点，而是前置阶段，是从“无人可管”过渡到“能够依法管理”的中间桥梁。

国际类比与未来展望：托管作为大型企业重组的前置机制

从国际实践看，大型复杂企业的治理危机往往难以依靠单一法律程序解决。美国的 Chapter 11 强调“持续经营价值”优先于清算价值，法院借助债务人自主管理机制恢复企业治理能力；欧洲的预重整制度强调在司法介入前，通过临时治理措施维持经营连续性；日本的民事再生法同样强调经营不中断，由监督人确保企业在透明框架下继续运营。中国的托管式偿债虽非法定程序，但其制度逻辑与上述体系高度契合：在资产过于复杂、利益过于多元、程序难以启动时，通过临时治理机制重建秩序，为正式重组创造条件。

因此，托管式化债并不是对破产制度的替代，也不是万能方案，而是在治理失序和程序受阻情况下的一种“前置治理工具”，最适合规模巨大、资产分散、权属复杂、社会影响广泛、且具有一定恢复价值的大型民营集团。在这些企业中，破产清算难以保护价值，重整程序又因治理失序而无法顺利推进，而市场化交易因信息不透明和权属风险而无法启动。托管为这些企业提供了重新焕发经营能力的机会，使其从治理僵局走向制度化的重组路径。

随着中国债务重组体系的不断发展，托管式化债正在从“应急机制”演化为大型复杂企业重组中的一项可选路径。在治理断裂最严重、财务信息最不透明、法律程序最难落地的情况下，托管提供了一种非对抗性的治理方式，使企业能够在混乱中重拾秩序，在危机中保存价值，并最终走向真正的重组与修复。