INTERNATIONAL COUNSEL: An Introduction to Corporate Crime & Investigations

US Financial Crime Enforcement Under Trump 2.0: Compliance Implications for Businesses Operating in Latin America

Since President Trump returned to office, the United States has significantly shifted its approach to financial-crime enforcement – most notably by designating major drug cartels and other transnational criminal organisations as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) and imposing sweeping economic sanctions that increase legal exposure for companies operating in or with Latin America. At the same time, the government has recalibrated its white-collar enforcement priorities to focus on protecting US national interests while incentivising corporate co-operation. These developments form part of a broader “maximum pressure” strategy – marked by new tariffs, export controls and immigration-related actions targeting US adversaries and those perceived to support them.

In this context, businesses must now navigate both traditional risks involving money laundering, corruption and sanctions evasion, as well as the novel danger of transactions that could be treated under the rubric of material support for terrorist organisations. Accordingly, the new enforcement policies and priorities present a series of legal and compliance challenges that demand immediate attention from directors, in-house counsel, compliance officers and other key stakeholders.

Emerging white-collar enforcement priorities

In May 2025, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued guidance emphasising high‑impact priorities. These include:

• waste, fraud and abuse harming US government programmes;
• trade and customs violations, particularly tariff‑evasion schemes;
• investor‑facing frauds, including manipulative activity involving variable interest entities and digital‑asset schemes;
• sanctions‑evasion and gatekeeper misconduct;
• corporate support to designated terrorist organisations;
• complex money‑laundering networks, including Chinese‑operated systems that move pre-cursor fentanyl proceeds across borders; and
• bribery tied to undermining US national interests and causing competitive harm.

The guidance also stresses individual accountability, faster investigations and case‑by‑case charging decisions.

At the same time, the DOJ’s Criminal Division strengthened incentives for self-reporting and co-operation. Companies that disclose misconduct, assist investigators and remediate effectively can expect clearer outcomes – ranging from formal decisions not to prosecute to significant fine reductions. Additionally, where oversight is warranted, co-operating companies can expect monitorships to be narrowly focused and short in duration.

Building on this broader enforcement reset, and consistent with President Trump’s new executive orders, the DOJ also announced a significant pivot in its approach to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigations. In June 2025, following a 180‑day pause on initiating new investigations (with some narrow exceptions), the DOJ issued guidance refocusing FCPA enforcement on serious, individual‑driven misconduct that directly threatens US interests. Priority is now given to the prosecution of bribery schemes that facilitate drug cartel or Transnational Criminal Organisation (TCO) operations, disadvantage specific American competitors, or corrupt strategic infrastructure. Additionally, prosecutors are instructed to focus on large-scale bribery schemes involving concealment, falsified records or obstruction of justice, rather than minor or technical compliance failures, and to give due weight to the FCPA’s established exceptions and defences.

New OFAC and terrorism-related designations

Executive Order 14157, signed in January 2025, created a process for designating cartels and other organisations as FTOs and Specifically Designated Global Terrorists (“SDGTs”). In February 2025, the US Department of State used this authority to designate eight groups as both FTOs and SDGTs, including several Mexican drug cartels, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua. These designations were implemented the following month by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which added the designated organisations to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, triggering economic sanctions that prohibit virtually all business transactions by US persons, block property or interests in property within US jurisdiction, and extend to entities owned or controlled by those organisations.

By extending terrorism authorities to criminal organisations, the United States has blurred traditional boundaries between sanctions, counternarcotics, counterterrorism and corruption enforcement. This toolkit was just unveiled with respect to Colombia, where OFAC applied counternarcotics sanctions to a sitting head of state. In October 2025, the United States sanctioned President Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego, his son, and other members of his cabinet under counternarcotics authorities, for “having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production”.

For businesses operating in the region, the unprecedented designations highlight the heightened risk of cascading sanctions and criminal exposure through government contracts, intermediaries and politically connected counterparties – and highlights the urgent need for enhanced sanctions screening, counterparty due diligences and proactive communications with OFAC and other federal agencies.

Moreover, exposure to civil litigation is rising alongside legal risk. Under the US Antiterrorism Act, victims of terrorism may bring private suits against individuals or entities that provide material support to groups designated as FTOs. As the United States expands its use of FTO designations to encompass transnational criminal groups, companies face an increased risk of being drawn into private litigation based on historical or indirect dealings.

FinCEN measures and the emerging AML/CFT framework

In parallel with the Trump administration’s broader “maximum pressure” strategy, the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) has been proactive in shaping a new anti-money-laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, with a growing focus on the United States–Mexico border. The Southwest Border Geographic Targeting Order (GTO) – most recently modified in September 2025 – requires certain money services businesses in designated counties and ZIP codes in Texas and California to file Currency Transaction Reports for cash transactions between USD1,000 and USD10,000, lowering reporting thresholds in regions identified as high-risk. FinCEN has also issued a series of alerts concerning oil-smuggling and bulk-cash networks linked to Mexico-based cartels, instructing financial institutions to integrate specific red-flag indicators into transaction-monitoring systems and to reassess their correspondent-banking and cross-border payment exposures.

Building on this focus, FinCEN, in June 2025, took its first enforcement actions under the FEND Off Fentanyl Act of 2024, identifying three major Mexico-based financial institutions as primary money-laundering concerns associated with illicit-opioid trafficking. These findings triggered unprecedented special-measures orders, effectively restricting certain fund transmittals involving those institutions.

At the same time, FinCEN has begun redefining its expectations for compliance programmes. In September 2025, FinCEN demonstrated its reform agenda by seeking public comment on a proposed survey measuring the costs of AML/CFT compliance across non-bank financial sectors. Similarly, in October 2025, the agency issued new Frequently Asked Questions clarifying Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act. FinCEN’s message appears to be that effectiveness, not volume, now drives supervisory expectations.

Collectively, these actions mark FinCEN’s transition from a reactive intelligence unit to a strategic regulator at the intersection of financial integrity and national security.

Corporate governance implications for businesses in the region

The essential elements of corporate compliance programmes – senior management commitment, risk assessment, internal controls, testing, auditing and training – should be adapted to the new regulatory landscape. Some of the immediate priorities include:

• upgrading sanctions screening to capture FTO/SDGT designation updates and ownership aggregation under the 50% rule;
• mapping beneficial ownership to identify entities controlled by designated persons;
• enhancing due diligence for distributors, customs brokers and other third parties in high‑risk corridors;
• strengthening trade‑finance and supply‑chain controls responsive to tariff‑evasion and trade‑based money‑laundering typologies; and
• setting clear escalation protocols where terrorism‑support issues may arise.

Companies should also prepare protocols for timely self‑disclosure, co-operation and remediation aligned with the DOJ’s updated enforcement policies.