Extradition: An Overview

Changes to Part 2 of the Extradition Act 

Against the backdrop of broader calls for a comprehensive review of the UK’s extradition framework, including core concerns around the monitoring of assurances, operation of the forum bar and specialty, delays in charging decisions and the overlap with asylum claims, on 17 July 2025, the government laid the Extradition Act (2003) (Amendment to Designations) Order 2025 before Parliament.

The Order pertains to designations under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, which governs extradition requests from Category 2 countries – ie, those with which the UK has treaty arrangements in place. Unlike Category 1 requests (largely comprising EU member states), Category 2 requests ordinarily require the requesting state to provide evidence sufficient to make a case to answer.

The Order sparked controversy insofar as it relates to the UK’s extradition arrangements with Hong Kong. Whilst Hong Kong technically remains designated as a Category 2 territory, the underlying treaty between the UK and Hong Kong was suspended five years ago amidst concerns about the city’s national security laws and corresponding decline in civil and political freedoms. Given that there is now no international agreement or arrangement in place, the Order proposes to omit Hong Kong from the list.

However, at the same time, the government has indicated that it intends to reinstate co-operation with Hong Kong on a case-by-case basis under Section 194 of the Act. In a letter accompanying the Order, the Security Minister, Dan Jarvis, emphasised that it is in the UK’s national interest to have effective extradition relationships to prevent the UK from becoming a “haven for criminals”.

The apparent move to reinstate extradition to Hong Kong was the subject of immediate criticism. In a letter published on X, Alicia Kearnes MP suggested that the proposal is “morally indefensible” as the “Chinese Communist Party has turned Hong Kong into a surveillance state where freedom of expression, rule of law, and basic civil liberties are systematically dismantled”.

The Order also proposes the omission of Zimbabwe from Part 2 (on the basis that it is no longer party to the London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth) as well the inclusion of Chile in the list of countries that are not required to present prima facie evidence, given that it has earlier this year acceded to the European Convention on Extradition 1957.

Supreme Court Judgments

El-Khouri

On 12 February 2025, the Supreme Court handed down judgment in El-Khouri v USA which concerns the operation of the “double criminality” rule in Section 137 of the EA 2003. Section 137(3) applies where the conduct occurred in the requesting state and the conduct would constitute an offence in the UK if it occurred here. Section 137(4) applies where the conduct occurred outside the requesting state and in corresponding circumstances such conduct would constitute an extra-territorial offence in the UK.

Mr El-Khouri was charged with insider dealing. Whilst the dealing itself occurred outside the USA, its effects were said to have been felt on the US markets. In seeking Mr El-Khouri’s extradition, the USA relied on Section 137(3), arguing that his conduct took place in the USA on the basis of the House of Lords decision in Office of the King’s Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas, where Lord Hope stated (obiter) that conduct occurs “in” the requesting state even if the person is not physically present in the territory, provided that effects of their conduct are intentionally felt there. 

The Supreme Court disagreed and clarified that the normal and natural meaning of the word “conduct” is concerned solely with where the physical acts were done and not with where any effects of those acts were felt. Accordingly, the applicable provision in this case was Section 137(4) on the basis that the conduct occurred physically outside the USA. The decision had significant implications for Mr El-Khouri given that insider dealing is not an extra-territorial offence in the UK (where either the dealing, the regulated market on which the dealing occurs, or the intermediary, must be in the UK).

Andrysiewicz

On 11 June 2025, the Supreme Court delivered judgment in Andrysiewicz v Poland, affirming the restrictive approach to extradition challenges made under Article 8 of European Convention on Human Rights – the right to respect for private and family life. 

Having called out the regular reliance on Article 8, raised “almost as a matter of course in virtually every extradition case”, the court noted that it is “most unlikely” that extradition will be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life, and even when interference with family life is relied on, to have any prospects of success the impact on family life must be “exceptionally severe”. Whilst the practical impact of the judgment remains to be seen, it appears that the Article 8 defence is now an endangered species.

International Police Co-operation

Silver Notices

2025 saw the publication of the first Silver Notices, which have been a decade in the making. This new weapon in INTERPOL’s colour-coded arsenal (presently still in its pilot phase) is designed to assist with the identification and recovery of assets linked to criminal activity, and may be published to locate or identify assets, obtain information about assets or (discreetly) monitor them for the purposes of both criminal and civil forfeiture. The Silver Notice therefore has the potential to become a powerful tool, enabling UK authorities to expand existing civil recovery efforts beyond easily identifiable domestic assets. 

However, whilst Silver Notices may provide a quicker and less cumbersome mechanism than mutual legal assistance procedures which states must otherwise deploy, they are not without risk of being abused. Although requests for Silver Notices are to be reviewed by the General Secretariat before publication to ensure compliance with the organisation’s rules, including the prohibition on political misuse under Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution, INTERPOL’s troublesome history with Red Notices demonstrates the ease with which these mechanisms can be (and indeed frequently are) misused.

(Mis)use of Red Notices in the spotlight – yet again

Long-standing criticisms of the misuse of Red Notices by certain notorious states have recently been reflected in the publication of a damning report by the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights. The report, titled "Transnational Repression in the UK”, addressed the ongoing abuse of INTERPOL’s systems as a means of stifling dissent beyond borders, with Red Notices described as “the sniper rifle of autocrats… long-distance, targeted, and highly effective”.

In addition to the usual calls for the government to “put pressure on INTERPOL to reform procedures and call out serial abusers”, the report recommends the introduction of a formal mechanism by which the Home Office or the National Crime Agency could alert individuals to the existence of a Red Notice in circumstances where there is a strong basis to believe it has been politically motivated. Such a mechanism would be invaluable for the targets of abusive Red Notices, not least given the current delays in the examination of access requests which mean that individuals invariably have to wait months, if not years, before they are informed whether an abusive Notice against them has been issued.

It is always darkest under the lamppost…

On 18 July 2025, it was reported that Vitalie Pirlog, the former chair of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files – ironically, the body tasked with ensuring that data held in the organisation’s systems is compliant with its legislative framework – was arrested in the UAE and extradited to France. Mr Pirlog is accused of accepting bribes to facilitate the improper removal of Red Notices. At least 30 Notices are said to have been affected, many of which were subsequently tied to prominent fugitives or politically connected individuals who, thanks to Mr Pirlog’s efforts, were able freely to travel and effectively evade the ongoing criminal investigations against them.