An Analysis of the Legal Nuances in Sexual Harassment Inquiries

An Analysis of the Legal Nuances in Sexual Harassment Inquiries: Lessons from Dr Amit Kumar v. University of Delhi

The recent judgment in Dr Amit Kumar v. University of Delhi offers significant insights into the legal intricacies surrounding inquiries into sexual harassment complaints. This analytical article delves into the various legal challenges raised by the petitioner, an Assistant Professor, against his compulsory retirement following sexual harassment allegations, and the Delhi High Court's nuanced approach in upholding the inquiry process and its findings. The case underscores the judiciary's commitment to balancing principles of natural justice with the transformative objectives of anti-harassment legislation.

I. Background of the Matter

The case originated from four complaints of sexual harassment lodged against Dr. Amit Kumar, an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Bharati College, affiliated with Delhi University. Three complaints were from current students, and one from an alumnus, alleging sexual innuendoes and advances via Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp chats. A video of a confrontation between the petitioner and some complainants, which became public in February 2018, precipitated the formal complaints and agitation among students demanding an inquiry.

The Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) was constituted to inquire under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act) and UGC (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal of sexual harassment of women employees and students in higher educational institutions) Regulations, 2015 (UGC Regulations). The ICC found all four charges of sexual harassment proven and unanimously recommended the petitioner's compulsory retirement, a recommendation accepted by the Governing Body of Bharati College and subsequently approved by the Vice Chancellor of Delhi University. The petitioner challenged these orders, raising multiple objections concerning the ICC's constitution, the inquiry procedure, and the findings.

II. Key Legal Frameworks

The judgment primarily interprets and applies the provisions of the POSH Act, 2013, and the UGC Regulations, 2015. Central to the petitioner's arguments were alleged violations of principles of natural justice, particularly the right to a fair hearing. The Court's analysis also frequently refers to the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters, emphasizing restraint while ensuring findings are supported by evidence and free from perverse conclusions.

III. Analysis of Legal Nuances

A. Constitution and Procedure of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC)

The petitioner challenged the ICC's composition, arguing it was improperly constituted by the Staff Council rather than the Governing Body, had an incorrect number of faculty members, lacked properly qualified non-teaching members, included only undergraduate students, and had an improperly appointed external member.

The Court, however, found no illegality. It observed that while Regulation 4(1)(b) of the UGC Regulations stipulated two faculty members, the presence of three did not vitiate the composition unless prejudice was shown. For non-teaching members, the criterion of being "committed to the cause of women or having social work experience or legal knowledge" is stipulated as a preference, not a mandatory requirement. The inclusion of undergraduate students was justified as they were elected through a student election, reflecting the demographic of the college where students were primarily undergraduates. The appointment of the external member after a resignation was also deemed procedurally sound.

A significant procedural nuance was the petitioner's objection to the Enquiry Committee recording evidence, arguing it should have been the ICC en banc. The Court clarified that Rule 7(7) of the POSH Rules permits a minimum of three ICC members (including the Presiding Officer) to conduct the inquiry, meaning it is not mandatory for the entire ICC to be present. The Court found no procedural violation in the ICC constituting an Enquiry Committee for the limited purpose of recording evidence. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner had previously consented not to press this specific objection in an earlier writ petition.

On the issue of the Petitioner's Defence Assistant (DA) and cross-examination, the petitioner claimed denial or delayed permission for a DA and denial of face-to-face cross-examination of complainants and witnesses, with their identities concealed. The Court noted that permission for a DA was granted despite complainant objections, but the petitioner used this opportunity to seek frequent adjournments. Crucially, the Court upheld the procedure of written questionnaires for cross-examination and concealment of identities, citing Section 16 of the POSH Act (identity concealment) and the SAKSHAM Guidelines of the UGC. The Court referenced Supreme Court judgments (e.g., Sakshi v. Union of India, Union of India v. Dilip Paul) which emphasize protecting victims of sexual harassment from re-traumatization and embarrassment, thus allowing the inquiry authority to ask questions on behalf of the accused. This demonstrates a balancing act between the accused's right to defense and the complainant's right to protection and dignity.

B. Navigating the Limitation Period for Sexual Harassment Complaints

The petitioner strenuously argued that three of the four complaints were barred by the three-month limitation period under Section 9(1) of the POSH Act. The ICC had condoned this delay, citing reasons such as the "continuous harassment" experienced by the complainants, their rural backgrounds, fear of retaliation, lack of awareness of redressal mechanisms, and the petitioner's own actions in emotionally manipulating them not to complain.

The High Court found no infirmity in the ICC's reasoning. It emphasized that sexual harassment incidents, particularly in a power dynamic between a professor and students, often involve persistent unease and fear of retaliation. The Court noted that the video's public release in February 2018 acted as a "pinnacle" of continuous harassment, prompting formal complaints. The Court also highlighted the petitioner's own conduct in preventing earlier complaints by pleading with the students. The Court cited Union of India v. Mudrika Singh, which deprecates invalidation of sexual misconduct inquiries due to "hyper technical interpretations of the applicable service rules," stressing the importance of upholding the spirit of the POSH Act to provide a safe and secure environment for female students.

C. Defining "Workplace" and "Aggrieved Woman" in the Digital Age

The petitioner contended that the complaint from the alumnus (Complainant No. 1) could not be entertained as she was a former student, thus not an "aggrieved woman" under the POSH Act, and that the alleged incidents on social media (Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp) did not occur at a "workplace".

The ICC, upheld by the Court, adopted a broad interpretation of "aggrieved woman" and "workplace". It held that the scope of the ICC to entertain complaints is not limited to students currently on the college roll, applying the UGC Regulations broadly. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the ICC's finding that interactions on phone mediums and social media platforms (like WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger) constituted an extension of the work relationship, especially since the petitioner had shared his number or initiated contact. This implies a recognition that the digital space can function as an extension of the workplace in modern educational settings, reflecting a nuanced understanding of contemporary interactions.

D. The Appellate Process and the Requirement of a Speaking Order

The petitioner argued that he was denied proper appellate remedy and that the Governing Body's decision to compulsorily retire him was a non-speaking order, failing to consider his appeal and violating earlier High Court directions.

The Court found that the petitioner failed to avail the prescribed statutory appellate remedy under Section 18 of the POSH Act or Regulation 8(5) of the UGC Regulations. Instead, he filed a "representation" to the Vice Chancellor, despite being aware of the correct legal channels. This was seen as a deliberate tactic to delay proceedings.

Regarding the "non-speaking order" challenge, the Court noted that Regulation 8(6) of the UGC Regulations only mandates "written reasons" if the Executive Authority disagrees with the ICC's recommendations, not when it agrees. The Court reiterated that the Governing Body, acting as the disciplinary authority, had observed due process: it considered the ICC report, sought a representation from the petitioner, granted him a personal hearing (where he spoke for 90 minutes), issued a show-cause notice for the proposed punishment, and considered his subsequent reply.

Crucially, the Court applied the "test of prejudice" (from State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma and State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora) to procedural violations. This test assesses whether a procedural irregularity actually resulted in the delinquent being prejudiced or denied a fair hearing. The Court concluded that despite the Governing Body not issuing a separate "speaking order" when affirming the ICC's comprehensive findings, the petitioner was afforded "more than sufficient opportunities" to present his case, and therefore, no prejudice was caused. The Court further emphasized that "unless the impugned order suffers from an ex facie violation of the principles rule of natural justice, the order of an authority which has no statutory or implied duty to state reasons or the grounds of its decision, is not rendered illegal merely on account of absence of reasons".

IV. Conclusion

The Dr Amit Kumar judgment provides a robust reaffirmation of the legal framework governing sexual harassment complaints in India. The Delhi High Court, through a detailed and nuanced examination of each objection, has demonstrated its commitment to:

• Prioritizing the spirit and objective of anti-harassment laws over hyper-technical interpretations of procedural rules.

• Adopting flexible and practical interpretations of terms like "workplace" and "aggrieved woman" to encompass evolving forms of harassment.

• Balancing the rights of the accused with the need to protect complainants, particularly in sensitive cases involving power dynamics, through measures like identity concealment and guided cross-examination.

• Applying the "test of prejudice" to procedural irregularities, ensuring that minor deviations do not derail legitimate inquiries when a fair hearing has demonstrably been provided.

This ruling reinforces that while principles of natural justice are paramount, their application must be seen in the context of the legislative intent to provide effective prevention and redressal mechanisms against sexual harassment. The judiciary will not readily interfere with findings supported by evidence and arrived at through a process that, while not always perfect, ensures fundamental fairness.

Disclaimer: The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

Authors:

Gyanendra Mishra, Partner