Executive Summary
On 17 March 2026, the Supreme Court of India (“Court”) in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India [1] delivered a significant judgment on maternity protection for adoptive mothers. The Court held that section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (“COSS”), insofar as it restricted maternity benefit to a woman adopting a child below the age of 3 (three) months, was violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Court further held that section 60(4) of the COSS must now be meaningfully read so that a woman who legally adopts a child, without any such age restriction, is entitled to maternity benefit for 12 (twelve) weeks from the date the child is handed over to her.
Statutory Background
The writ petition was originally framed as a challenge to section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (“MB Act”), as inserted by the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017. During the pendency of the proceedings, the COSS came into force and section 60(4) of the COSS became the operative pari materia provision.
In its enacted form, section 60(4) granted maternity benefit for 12 (twelve) weeks from the date of handover to (i) a woman who legally adopts a child below the age of 3 (three) months, or (ii) a commissioning mother. The challenge before the Court was therefore directed at the constitutional validity of the 3 (three) month age threshold.
Maternity Protection as a Constitutional and Human Value
The Court noted that maternity benefit is intended to provide economic security at a stage when a woman is intensively engaged in the care and nurture of a young child, and to enable her continued participation in the workforce.
While the Court ultimately rests its conclusions on Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian constitution, it situates maternity protection within a broader human rights framework, recognising that such protection serves to correct structural disadvantages faced by women in employment. This framing allows the Court to move beyond a narrow statutory reading and towards a purposive, equality-oriented interpretation.
From Childbirth to Motherhood: The Conceptual Shift
The judgment rejects a purely biological understanding of maternity benefit provided to a woman employee. Speaking for the Bench, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, for himself and Justice R. Mahadevan, held that the object of maternity benefit is not associated with the process of childbirth alone, but with the process of motherhood. It also observes that the commonly drawn distinction between biological mothers and adoptive mothers rests on an unduly narrow view of motherhood and fails to account for the bond that develops between mother and child outside the womb.
The Court recognises that the purpose of maternity protection does not vary based on the manner in which the child is brought into the life of the mother. It then identified 3 (three) broad components of maternity leave:
- First, the time necessary for physical recovery following childbirth, which concerns both the well-being of the mother and the child.
- Second, the time required to nurture and develop the emotional bond between the mother and the child.
- Third, the time necessary to attend to the physical and emotional needs of the child and to facilitate the process by which the child gradually integrates into the family, with the mother often acting as the primary medium through which the child is introduced to the familial environment.
The Court clarified, that while the first component may be absent in the case of adoption or surrogacy, the second and third components remain present and significant from a maternity benefit perspective.
The judgment implicitly also acknowledges a broader structural concern: that caregiving responsibilities remain disproportionately borne by women, and that legal frameworks must provide institutional support to mitigate the resulting inequalities.
Article 14: The Failure of the Classification
The Court while analyzing Article 14 of the Indian constitution held that women adopting a child below the age of 3 (three) months and those adopting a child aged 3 (three) months or above are similarly situated for the purposes of maternity protection.
The classification introduced by section 60(4) of the COSS was therefore held to be constitutionally unsustainable on three independent grounds, from the perspective of Article 14 of the Indian constitution:
- it did not disclose a reasonable basis for differentiation;
- it had no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation; and
- it suffered from under inclusiveness by excluding similarly situated adoptive mothers from the statutory benefit.
This reasoning reflects a substantive equality approach. The Court examined the purpose of maternity legislation, to dignify motherhood, safeguard well being, and facilitate women’s continued participation in the workforce through institutional support. Once this purpose is identified, the exclusion of adoptive mothers of children above 3 (three) months becomes difficult to justify.
The Court further noted that the age cap classification assumes greater significance in cases involving children with disabilities, who may be adopted later, and in the case of single adoptive mothers, who bear the full burden of caregiving alongside professional obligations.
Article 21: Reproductive Autonomy and Child Welfare
The Court also held that the impugned age restriction violated Article 21 of the Indian constitution. It observed that reproductive autonomy is not confined to the biological act of giving birth and that adoption is an equal exercise of reproductive and decisional autonomy. The judgment recognises that non biological modes of parenthood are entitled to equal constitutional respect and protection.
The Court also adopted a child centred approach. It held that the best interests of the child do not conclude with the formal completion of adoption, but continue through the period of adjustment, bonding, and emotional stabilisation within the adoptive family.
By imposing a rigid age based exclusion, section 60(4) of the COSS failed to account for these continuing dimensions of child welfare. The provision was therefore constitutionally infirm not only in its impact on the mother, but also in its disregard for the interests of the child.
The Workability Defect
The Court while noting that accessibility of law does not mean formal existence, but the actual ability to avail the benefits, looked at the statutory workability defect for adoptive mother. It examined the adoption framework under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and noted that the statutory process for declaring a child legally free for adoption necessarily involves time bound but essential safeguards.
These include processes for tracing biological parents in the case of orphaned or abandoned children, and reconsideration periods in the case of surrendered children. The Court emphasised that these safeguards are integral to the statutory scheme and cannot be compressed.
In this context, the Court held that by the time a child is declared legally free for adoption, the child is unlikely to remain within the 3 (three) month threshold contemplated by section 60(4) of the COSS. The result is that the provision becomes illusory and devoid of practical application.
This demonstrates that the Court’s analysis was not confined to doctrinal abstraction, but extended to the actual operation of the law.
Crèche Facilities and the Limits of Substitution
The Union of India argued that adoptive mothers of older children could avail crèche facilities under section 67 of the COSS. The Court rejected this submission.
It held that crèche facilities and maternity leave serve fundamentally different purposes. While a crèche provides workplace childcare support during working hours, it cannot substitute the mother’s presence during the critical period of bonding and adjustment following adoption.
Further, the statutory obligation to provide crèche facilities applies only to establishments meeting a prescribed threshold, leaving many workplaces outside its ambit.
Observations on Paternity Leave
In the concluding paragraphs Court made an observation on paternity leave and highlighted the importance of paternal presence in early caregiving and the need to move towards shared parental responsibility.
The Court noted that Indian law is not entirely unfamiliar with paternity leave. In particular, sections 43A and 43AA of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules provide 15 days of paternity leave to male government servants, including in cases of adoption. It also referred to the Paternity and Parental Benefit Bill, 2025, which seeks to introduce a more comprehensive framework, including 8 weeks of paternity leave.
Against this backdrop, the Court urged Union of India to consider recognising paternity leave as a social security benefit.
Its significance lies in situating maternity protection within a broader constitutional conversation on the redistribution of caregiving responsibilities and the need to address the institutional invisibility of unpaid care work.
Implications for Employers
From an employer perspective, the immediate consequence of the judgment is interpretive. Although section 60(4), as published, continues to contain the 3 (three) month age restriction, the provision must now be read without that limitation insofar as adoptive mothers are concerned. The Court expressly stated that section 60(4) should now be meaningfully read as follows:
“(4) A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning mother, as the case may be.”
Employers should therefore review maternity benefit policies, employee handbooks, and HR administration practices to ensure alignment with the judgment. Any continued reliance on the unmodified statutory text would carry compliance risk.
Conclusion
The judgment in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India [1] marks an important development in Indian employment and constitutional law. It affirms that maternity protection is not limited to childbirth, but extends to caregiving, bonding, adjustment, and family integration following adoption
References
[1] Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
Author:
Gyanendra Kumar Mishra, Partner
Disclaimer:
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.