Mexico’s Judiciary Overhaul: A Threat to Independence Under the Guise of Reform

On 15 September 2024, just 15 days before the end of his term as Mexico’s President, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (“AMLO”) signed into law a constitutional amendment that will completely transform Mexico’s judiciary and will undoubtedly be remembered as the most consequential decision of his presidency. As we explore in this article, this amendment will radically transform Mexico’s judiciary at every level, as among other changes, the amendment mandates the replacement of every judge, including the Supreme Court’s Justices, by 2027. More importantly, the constitutional amendment mandates that all new judges will be selected through public elections.

AMLO promoted the amendment on a narrative of pushing for a judiciary that is closer to the people and more accountable to the public’s interests. However, beneath this veneer of progress lies serious erosion of judicial independence, with far-reaching implications for the rule of law.

The origins of this amendment can be traced back to a broader political climate characterised by the President’s distrust in the Supreme Court and a drive by his administration to assert more direct control over them. Due to several Supreme Court decisions that declared policies unconstitutional, AMLO has long been vocal about his dissatisfaction with the judiciary, often portraying it as an elitist body, disconnected from the people’s needs and profoundly corrupt.

After several setbacks before the Supreme Court, AMLO began promoting a so-called Plan C, which essentially aimed to obtain a super majority in both houses of Congress and state legislatures, effectively allowing him to amend the Constitution. After June’s general election and a very controversial decision by Mexico’s highest court on election matters, AMLO’s party secured the seats needed to put Plan C into motion. While AMLO’s last day in office was 1 October , the newly elected Congress entered into office on 1 September. This gave AMLO a month to aggressively push several constitutional amendments, including the judicial reform, which was approved with virtually no changes from the original bill and in a record time of 15 days.

The speed and controversy surrounding the amendment have left many questioning whether this reform is genuinely aimed at improving the judiciary or whether it is a calculated step to consolidate power and reduce the independence of a crucial check on executive authority.

The most striking part of the amendment is the introduction of popular elections for judges. Before the amendment, federal judges were appointed based on their professional credentials and exam scores. Judges, traditionally insulated from public and political pressures to ensure their impartiality, will now have to campaign for votes. While the goal of public involvement sounds commendable, it raises concerns about the impact on judicial independence and the proficiency of the judges. The idea of electing judges turns the judiciary into a popularity contest and by no means achieves the alleged goal of the amendment of stamping out corruption. On the contrary, forcing judges to run for office virtually ensures that they will be more inclined to adopt positions that align with public sentiment, political influence or delinquent groups, undermining their role as impartial arbiters of the law.

Another major change involves the restriction on issuing injunctions with general effects. Historically, such injunctions allowed the judiciary to pause the application of laws that were deemed unconstitutional, protecting public interests while the courts reviewed their validity. Removing this power significantly reduces the judiciary’s ability to act as a check on the executive and legislative branches. This shift could pave the way for policies to be implemented unchecked, even if their constitutionality is in doubt, effectively limiting the courts’ oversight function and raising questions about the balance of power.

The reform also imposes strict deadlines for tax and criminal cases, a move presented to increase judicial efficiency. However, these deadlines could place undue pressure on judges, compelling them to prioritise speed over careful consideration of cases. This rush to judgment could ultimately affect the fairness and quality of judicial outcomes. Moreover, the establishment of a Judicial Discipline Tribunal (JDT) tasked with overseeing delays introduces another layer of control over the judiciary, potentially serving as a mechanism to pressure judges into compliance with politically motivated goals.

The first popular elections for judicial posts will take place in 2025. Citizens will have to vote on a single day for almost fifteen hundred judges from among more than ten thousand candidates. The logistics of this election are unprecedented and place the impossible burden on the citizens of knowing the candidates and their credentials. In our view, this election system is deeply flawed and will not achieve any of the aims of the amendment. It will certainly result in the election of judges that are not the most competent option as there is no link between popularity and judicial competence.

The election of judges will significantly destroy the professional judiciary that took decades to build. Additionally, judges may now have to consider how their decisions will play in the court of public opinion, potentially undermining their role as defenders of minority rights and guardians of the Constitution. In our view, the judiciary’s transformation will lead to an erosion of the core principle that justice must be impartial, regardless of public or political pressures.

The recent overhaul of Mexico’s judiciary, while couched in the language of reform, risks undermining the very foundations of an independent judicial system. The promise of increased accountability may come at too high a price if it leads to the politicisation of the courts and compromises the quality of justice. In our view, it will result in a judiciary that is beholden to political forces, unable to uphold its duty as the impartial guardian of the Constitution.

In a recent development, on 5 November 2024, the Mexican Supreme Court narrowly decided that it lacked jurisdiction to overturn the constitutional amendment. This decision greatly restricts the legal avenues to restore judicial independence.