Mexico: A Dispute Resolution: Civil & Commercial Litigation Overview

Mexico's Judicial Reform: A System in Transition

A judiciary reimagined

Mexico's federal judiciary is undergoing its most profound transformation in a century. The 2024 constitutional reform – followed less than two years later by a second corrective decree published on 2 June 2026 – has replaced a career-based appointment model with direct popular elections for all federal judges, including Supreme Court justices, circuit magistrates and district judges. The stated goals are democratic accountability, transparency, and the elimination of the opacity and corporatism that critics long associated with the prior system. How those ambitions translate into practice – and what they mean for businesses and attorneys operating in Mexico – is the defining legal question of this period.

The 2024 reform: the case for and against

Published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 15 September 2024, the judicial reform placed approximately 2,681 judicial positions on the ballot and dissolved the Federal Judiciary Council (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal), replacing it with a Judicial Administration Body and a Judicial Discipline Tribunal. The Supreme Court was reduced from 11 to nine justices and restructured to operate in plenary.

Proponents of the reform point to genuine problems in the prior model: a judiciary perceived as insular, difficult to hold accountable and, in some instances, susceptible to corruption and undue influence. The argument for popular election is that judges who must answer to citizens – rather than to an administrative council – are more likely to deliver justice that reflects social realities. Supporters also note that the Judicial Discipline Tribunal introduces a formal oversight mechanism that previously did not exist in the same form.

Critics, including the Institute for Legal Research (IIJ) of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México – UNAM) and international bodies such as the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges, have raised concerns about judicial independence and the risk that elected judges may be subject to political or financial pressures incompatible with impartial adjudication. For commercial litigators, a specific procedural change carries immediate weight: amparo judgments now benefit only the filing party, even when a general norm is challenged as unconstitutional, reducing the strategic reach of constitutional litigation for companies seeking sector-wide certainty.

The first election: promise and early challenges

On 1 June 2025, approximately 13 million Mexicans voted in the country's first judicial election. Turnout was relatively modest, and the integrity of the process drew criticism: academic observers documented the circulation of voting guides – so-called acordeones – that directed voters towards specific candidates, a practice associated with organised mobilisation by the ruling party. Scholars also noted a structural advantage enjoyed by candidates backed by the ruling party, which raised questions about the independence of the resulting judiciary from its inception (Gaceta UNAM, 1 June 2026).

The early performance of the new judiciary reflects the complexity of any large institutional transition. According to IIJ researcher José Antonio Caballero, the new Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación – SCJN) is resolving approximately 20% fewer matters than its predecessor in the same period, with 945 matters resolved between January and late April 2026 and 372 still pending. Some practitioners have noted uneven levels of technical specialisation among newly elected judges in complex commercial matters – a challenge the government itself has acknowledged and sought to address through the June 2026 reform. Business confidence, particularly among internationally oriented clients, has been sensitive to these early signals.

The June 2026 reform: refining the model

The constitutional decree of 2 June 026, in force since 3 June 2026, reflects the government's willingness to adapt the model based on early experience. Its central change is the introduction of a mandatory certification process for all judicial candidates, administered by the National School of Judicial Training. Individuals who have recently held party positions or stood as political candidates are also barred from competing.

Notably, the original executive proposal went further on professional experience requirements: it contemplated that candidates for the Supreme Court demonstrate at least ten years of legal practice – with five of those years served within the federal judiciary –– and seven years for circuit magistrates and district judges, likewise requiring five years of internal judicial experience. These requirements, which would have meaningfully raised the technical bar for candidates, did not survive intact in the final constitutional text as published. Their omission from the enacted decree is a significant detail for practitioners to note, as it leaves the minimum experience threshold lower than the government's own proposal envisioned.

The reform also partially reverses one of the 2024 changes: the Supreme Court may now operate in two Sections with Plenary approval, restoring functional flexibility that the prior text had eliminated. The Court's presidency will rotate every two years, assigned to the justice with the most votes in the corresponding election. The next judicial election is moved to 2028, with fewer candidacies and polling-station-level vote counting for greater transparency.

These adjustments signal an iterative approach to reform rather than a fixed endpoint. The certification requirement in particular responds directly to concerns about technical competence, and the partial reinstatement of Sections addresses the Court's capacity to manage its docket efficiently. Whether the 2028 election produces a measurably more qualified bench will be the clearest test of whether the model is self-correcting.

Implications for civil and commercial litigation

For parties operating in Mexico, the reform period calls for a recalibrated approach to dispute resolution rather than a wholesale abandonment of the Mexican courts. That said, a notable trend is the increased use of arbitration clauses in commercial contracts involving Mexican counterparties.

In litigation that proceeds through the Mexican courts, early engagement with the background and specialisation of the assigned judge has become a more prominent element of case strategy than it would have been under the prior system. This is not unique to Mexico – judicial transitions in many jurisdictions require counsel to adapt – but it is a practical reality of the current moment.

Outlook: 2026–28

Mexico's judicial reform is an ongoing experiment, and it is too early to render a final verdict. The underlying goals – greater accountability, broader public trust in the courts and a check on the insularity of the prior system – are legitimate. The path towards those goals has been uneven, and the June 2026 corrections acknowledge as much. The 2028 election, shaped by the new certification requirements, will be the next meaningful data point.

For businesses and their counsel, the practical message is one of informed vigilance rather than alarm. Mexico remains a major economy with an active and diverse litigation market. The reform has introduced uncertainty, and managing that uncertainty – through careful contract drafting, considered dispute resolution choices and close attention to judicial developments – is now an integral part of doing business in the country.