Connecticut: A Litigation: White-Collar Crime & Government Investigations Overview

DOJ White-Collar Enforcement: Key Developments Since Early 2025

Last year, we published an overview of significant shifts in DOJ white-collar enforcement priorities under the Trump administration, including then-Attorney General Pam Bondi’s February 2025 memoranda on prosecutorial discretion, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement, as well as the Criminal Division’s continuing emphasis on self-disclosure and cooperation. At the time of publication, many of the administration’s announced policy shifts were in their early stages, and the practical implications remained uncertain. Over the following year, the DOJ has taken several steps to implement and further define its announced enforcement priorities. Most notably, the DOJ issued new guidelines for FCPA investigations and enforcement in June 2025 (the “FCPA Guidelines”) and announced the DOJ-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (the “2026 CEP”) in March 2026.

Recent Developments

New FCPA enforcement guidelines

On 9 June 2025, then-Deputy Attorney General (now Acting Attorney General) Todd Blanche issued the FCPA Guidelines, effectively ending the 180-day pause on FCPA enforcement previously ordered by President Trump and setting forth a framework for the evaluation of FCPA investigations and enforcement actions going forward.

The FCPA Guidelines are intended to limit undue burdens on American companies operating overseas and to target enforcement actions against conduct that directly undermines US national interests. Prosecutors are thus directed to:

• focus on cases in which individuals have engaged in criminal misconduct and not attribute “nonspecific malfeasance” to corporations;
• proceed as expeditiously as possible in their investigations;
• consider collateral consequences of investigations, such as disruption to legitimate business activities; and
• prioritize misconduct bearing strong indicia of corrupt intent by particular individuals, such as substantial bribe payments and obstruction of justice, as opposed to minor or “routine” business practices.

The FCPA Guidelines further emphasize the current DOJ’s focus on particular US policy interests, and direct prosecutors to consider the following.

• Whether the conduct involves cartels or transnational criminal organizations (TCOs): consistent with former Attorney General Pam Bondi’s earlier memoranda, a “primary” consideration in assessing the propriety of an investigation or enforcement action is whether the potential misconduct involves a TCO or money laundering for a TCO, or is linked to foreign officials or state-owned entities who are linked to TCOs.
• Whether the conduct deprived US entities or individuals of fair competition or caused economic injury to American companies. The guidelines specifically state that “[t]he most blatant bribery schemes have historically been committed by foreign companies,” indicating that conduct by non-US companies that puts American companies at a competitive disadvantage could draw particular scrutiny.
• Whether the conduct poses a threat to US national security interests. The guidelines prioritize bribery that impacts US interests in key infrastructure or assets, such as critical minerals and ports, which implicate national security concerns.

Notably, the initiation of all new FCPA investigations or enforcement actions must now be authorized by the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division or a more senior DOJ official, placing control of FCPA enforcement under political appointees and eliminating the autonomy line AUSAs previously held over such investigations. The FCPA Guidelines further encourage prosecutors to consider whether it is appropriate in light of the guidelines’ overarching priorities to defer enforcement to civil regulators or foreign enforcement authorities.

The Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy

While the DOJ’s Justice Manual has long instructed prosecutors to consider a company’s self-reporting, cooperation and remediation efforts, the 2026 CEP establishes a DOJ-wide framework that links those factors to prescribed paths for declinations, non-prosecution agreements (NPAs), independent monitor decisions and penalty reductions. According to the DOJ, this new policy is designed to promote uniformity, predictability and fairness in how the DOJ pursues corporate criminal cases. All resolutions under the 2026 CEP must be approved by the Assistant Attorney General for the relevant division or the United States Attorney for the relevant district in coordination with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General.

2026 CEP classifications

The 2026 CEP classifies self-disclosures into three categories, with diminishing benefits to the disclosing company.

Declination

A company that voluntarily self-discloses, fully cooperates and timely remediates will receive a declination if there are no aggravating circumstances. The company must still pay disgorgement, forfeiture and restitution. Further, these declinations will be made public.

“Near Miss”

Where a company fully cooperated and timely remediated but is ineligible for a declination – either because its self-report did not fully qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure despite a good-faith effort or due to other aggravating circumstances – the DOJ will agree to an NPA (absent particularly egregious or multiple aggravating circumstances) which allows for a term of fewer than three years, not require an independent compliance monitor, and provide a reduction of 50% to 75% off the low end of the US Sentencing Guidelines fine range.

All other cases

Where the requirements of the categories above are not met, prosecutors retain full discretion over the form of any resolution and penalty. The maximum penalty reduction under this category is 50%, with a presumption that the reduction will start from the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range for companies that fully cooperate and timely remediate.

Voluntary self-disclosure requirements

Entitlement to a declination is contingent on five conditions:

• a good-faith disclosure to the appropriate DOJ criminal component;
• the misconduct was not already known to the DOJ;
• the company had no pre-existing obligation to disclose;
• the disclosure occurred before any imminent threat that the DOJ would learn of the conduct; and
• the company disclosed within a reasonably prompt time, with the burden on the company to demonstrate timeliness.

Importantly, disclosures made only to federal regulatory agencies, state and local governments, or civil enforcement agencies generally do not qualify as voluntary self-disclosures under the 2026 CEP, though such disclosures may be considered as part of a company’s cooperation and remediation.

Aggravating circumstances

The aggravating circumstances that may preclude a declination include:

• the nature and seriousness of the offense;
• the egregiousness or pervasiveness of the misconduct;
• the severity of the harm; and
• recidivism, defined as a criminal adjudication or resolution within the last five years, or a resolution based on similar misconduct by the entity engaged in the current misconduct.

Even with these aggravating factors, prosecutors retain discretion to recommend a declination after weighing these factors against the company’s self-disclosure, cooperation and remediation.

Full cooperation

The 2026 CEP provides a detailed description of what constitutes “full cooperation.” Key requirements include:

• disclosing all relevant non-privileged facts, including facts about all individuals involved regardless of position at the company;
• attributing facts to specific sources rather than providing a general narrative;
• proactively sharing relevant information even when not specifically asked;
• preserving and producing documents including those located overseas;
• taking steps to prevent the company’s internal investigation from interfering with the DOJ investigation (eg, by deferring witness interviews when requested); and
• making officers and employees available for interviews.

Remediation

A company earns remediation credit by demonstrating that it has:

• conducted a root-cause analysis and addressed the causes of the misconduct;
• implemented an effective compliance and ethics program;
• appropriately disciplined employees involved in or responsible for the misconduct;
• appropriately retained business records and implemented controls on personal and ephemeral messaging platforms; and
• taken additional steps demonstrating recognition of the seriousness of the misconduct, acceptance of responsibility, and implementation of measures to reduce the risk of repeat conduct.

In its assessment of a company’s compliance program, the 2026 CEP emphasizes that companies should not merely have a compliance program but should also ensure that the program is effective through risk assessment and testing.

Practical implications of the 2026 CEP

Despite the clear potential benefits, self-disclosure continues to carry risks, particularly as companies may feel pressure to approach the government before they have conducted a sufficient internal investigation to understand the full scope of the misconduct. The decision of whether, and when, to self-disclose is a complex, case-by-case question, requiring careful thought and guidance from counsel.

The apparent benefits available under the 2026 CEP provide clear incentives for companies that discover potential misconduct to promptly engage counsel, conduct a timely but thorough internal investigation, and assess the scope of the misconduct and potential exposure. The requirement for disclosure “as soon as reasonably practicable” means that companies may need to balance the length and scope of a desired internal investigation against the risk of loss of disclosure credit that could follow from a drawn-out investigation. Companies should also remain focused on maintaining effective and rigorous compliance programs as they cannot avail themselves of the potential benefits of the 2026 CEP if they do not detect the misconduct before the government does.