Opening up the Family Courts in England & Wales: Can Privacy Stay Protected While Greater Transparency is Achieved?

The Family Court In England and Wales has come under fire for being a “desert island” in the justice system, shrouded in secrecy and making its decisions behind closed doors. In October 2021 the then president of the Family Division, Sir Andrew Macfarlane, acknowledged that “justice taking place in private…is bound to lead to a loss of public confidence”. He called for the Family Court’s rules on transparency and reporting to be scrutinised and set up the Transparency Implementation Group (TIG).

Senior judges in the Financial Remedy Court (FRC) are not in agreement as to how to strike the right balance between transparency and privacy in matters such as who can attend hearings, what documents should be provided to reporters, and retaining parties’ anonymity. Mr Justice Mostyn has made waves by unequivocally asserting in a series of judgments since late 2021 that the FRC has been getting the law wrong for decades. Mostyn J’s position is that, whilst Family Court proceedings sit in “private” (as opposed to “open” court, like the majority of court divisions), that does not in and of itself require reporting restrictions or that the parties be anonymised when the judgment is published on a public database. He has made statements such as:

You might notice something that the above three cases have in common: you can read the names of the parties. That is because Mostyn J did not anonymise his judgments. The vast majority of financial remedy judgments heard by judges other than Mostyn J, however, continue to be anonymised. The lead FRC judge, Mr Justice Peel, has been the most prolific publisher of judgments since November 2021 and all have been anonymised. Since parties have no control over which judge hears their case, they face a bit of a lottery as to the publication protections they might be afforded.

TIG has just reported its findings on all issues of transparency as they relate to the FRC. Acknowledging Mostyn J’s judgments, it states “it is not for this report to set out what we consider the law to be on any particular, controversial, point. That must be a matter for the Court of Appeal. We acknowledge that there are different approaches to certain issues by different judges at High Court level and that this is far from ideal…it will be for others to decide whether the conclusions we reach should be implemented”.

The TIG report’s most critical recommendations can be summarised as follows:

Cases should continue to be heard in private - ie, the only individuals permitted to attend are the parties, their representatives, and accredited journalists. Efforts should be made to better inform practitioners and judges on what to do if a reporter attends their hearing.

Reporters attending hearings currently cannot see any case documents without specific permission of the Court, meaning that the hearing is often impossible for them to follow. The report recommends that, when a reporter attends, a standard Reporting Order be made by the judge which:

This is at the centre of Mostyn J’s standpoint and is arguably the most controversial issue. The report considers that “the default position should be one of anonymity”, but “there will be cases in which the presumption of anonymity will not be upheld”, which is a matter for the judge to decide on a case-by-case basis. Examples might include “situations of poor behaviour, either within the proceedings (by way of litigation conduct) or outside the proceedings in appropriate cases”, or where the public interest in identification outweighs the privacy justifications. The report also strongly encourages judges at all levels, not just High Court, to publish their judgments, to reset the imbalanced focus on “big money” cases heard by the High Court. 

The TIG report’s recommendations, if implemented, would undoubtedly provide greater clarity as to what parties to FRC proceedings can expect from a transparency and privacy perspective. The idea, however, that a party’s conduct could lead to a loss of their anonymity leaves much room for judicial discretion. What sort of behaviour outside of proceedings should this cover, what is the threshold for “poor behaviour”, and is it fair that one party’s poor behaviour could result in the other party’s identification? The question of transparency is by no means answered and we eagerly await a Court of Appeal case on the topic. In the meanwhile we will report back on the extent to which the TIG report recommendations are implemented by the Family Division.