YEMEN: An Introduction

The Political Climate in Yemen

The legal system in Yemen is based on Islamic law, with elements of civil law and tribal customs. The main source of law in Yemen is the Constitution, which was adopted in 1991 and amended in 1994. It is administered tripartite by the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General.

The general policy of the judiciary is determined by the Higher Judicial committee comprising seven members consisting of:

• the Minister of Justice;
• the deputy of such Minister, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;
• the deputy of the Chief Justice; and
• the Prosecutor General and two other senior jurists appointed by them.

In addition to the formal legal system, Yemen has a system of tribal justice, in which disputes within a tribe are resolved by the tribal leader or a council of elders. This system is often used to resolve disputes that arise in rural areas, where access to the formal legal system is limited.

It is important to note that the legal system in Yemen has been greatly disrupted due to the ongoing conflict in the country. The situation in Yemen is fluid, and it is advisable to seek the most up-to-date and reliable information before making any legal decisions or taking any legal action in the country.

Recent political developments in Yemen

Yemen is the Arabian Peninsula’s poorest and most populous country. Unemployment is high, and corruption has been widely perceived as being endemic. Yemen’s political rift started back in 2009 when the government and a six-party opposition coalition, the “Joint Meeting of Parties” (JMP), agreed, through a national dialogue, on a set of electoral and constitutional reforms. However, this dialogue collapsed in late 2010. On 31 December, the Council of Representatives discussed a series of constitutional amendments which included the reduction of the presidential term from seven to five years and the removal of the two-term presidential limit while introducing an electoral quota for women.

The said constitutional amendments caused anger from the majority of the citizens of Yemen, resulting in street protests. The ensuing protests, which have been generally peaceful, were further fuelled by unrest in other countries of the region. Permanent “sit-ins” appeared in several cities by February, with an increasing number of Yemenis taking to the streets either to call for governmental reforms or in support of the government.

On 2 February 2010, President Saleh announced that he would neither seek re-election nor have his son succeed him. However, following this announcement, demonstrators calling for governmental reforms repeatedly were met with violence, resulting in a significant number of deaths and injuries. Almost all political factions joined in support of the demands of what became known as “the popular revolution of the youth”. Subsequently, President Saleh alternated between offering further concessions, including sweeping constitutional reforms, and resorting to threatening rhetoric.

On 8 April 2011, a Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) initiative proposed the creation of a “Cabinet of National Accord”, according to which the President would transfer his powers to the Vice-President; and elections and the drafting and adoption of a new Constitution would follow. In exchange, the President and those who had served under him would be granted immunity from prosecution. While many protesters objected to the offer of immunity, the JMP reluctantly signed on 21 May followed by senior members of the ruling party. However, President Saleh repeatedly refused to personally sign the GCC initiative and, following his third refusal on 22 May, fighting erupted inside Sana’a. Residences and public buildings were heavily damaged in exchanges of fire involving artillery forcing thousands of inhabitants to flee, and violence soon spread beyond Sana’a.

Violence further escalated on 3 June, when an explosion during prayer inside the mosque of the presidential palace killed eleven and injured President Saleh and some other senior officials. The injured were evacuated to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. Prior to the 3 June attack, President Saleh had reportedly finally agreed to sign the GCC-led initiative. Yemeni authorities lost effective control of parts of the country and within the major cities, including the capital. Armed opponents were in de facto control of entire districts.

Between 2012–2014, Yemen witnessed continual street demonstrations and a state of lawlessness, and in September 2014, militia forces took over Sana’a. On 23 September 2014, the Security Council issued a press statement that President Abdorabuh Mansour Hadi is the legitimate President of Yemen based on election results and the terms of the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism.

On 21 January 2015, and as a result of the sudden resignation of President Hadi and the resignation of the entire government of Yemen headed by Prime Minister Bahhah, a political and constitutional void was created which resulted in the Ansar-Allah political faction (“the Houthi Factions”) announcing the dissolution of the government of Yemen and establishing a Supreme Political Council and a Revolutionary Council.

In response to the fall of the capital, Sana’a, the Security Council of the UN issued Resolution 2201, demanding that the Houthi Factions withdraw their forces from government institutions, including in Sana’a.

The status of the political dispute

It has never been more confusing, or more difficult, for companies to manage their affairs in Yemen. Companies are torn between two Presidents, two governments and two parliaments, each of which is claiming legitimacy; neither government recognises the other, and decisions of each of the governments are neither recognised nor implemented in the territories controlled by the other. Further, neither government is in a position to claim that it is effectively managing the territories it occupies. They are also not able to effectively generate sufficient income to pay for salaries or to secure basic services. Both governments are corruptible and have lost the trust of the people of Yemen.

The recent efforts of the UN Special Envoy to propose a roadmap for Yemen failed again, after having been rejected by both Sana’a and Aden. The draft proposal was too superficial and failed to understand the real causes behind the Yemen dispute. The proposal lacked certainty and assurances for the parties to trust that once accepted it will have the necessary power and backing of the UN and of the international community for it to be implemented. The people of Yemen remain extremely frustrated and disappointed.

As of today, there does not seem to be any realistic proposal submitted as a settlement of the Yemen dispute. The coalition headed by Saudi Arabia and the Yemen government in Aden are of the opinion that the only option they have to succeed is through military means, by taking over the entire country, while the Houthi Factions and affiliated tribes are of the opinion that they are in a position to resist any aggression, and that the coalition forces will never be in a position to capture any of the territories they control, as evidenced by their resistance since the commencement of Operation Decisive Storm back in March 2015.

Companies operating in Yemen, or intending to enter or exit the Yemen market, are required not only to take into consideration the legal framework, but also consider the current political climate in the country, as decisions or actions taken may be deemed to be in breach of either Yemeni or international law.