Reputation is often described as a person’s most valuable asset. Freedom of speech, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, is equally central to a democratic society. It includes the freedom to criticise, question and expose. Defamation law sits at the meeting point of these two interests. Nowhere is the tension sharper than when a plaintiff asks a court to stop a publication before its truth has been tested at trial.
Under Indian law, a plaintiff in defamation must show that the statement is defamatory, that it lowers the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society; that it refers to the plaintiff; and that it has been published to at least one other person. Where the attack is on a product, the claim takes the form of disparagement, which turns on falsity and malice. The principal defences are truth (justification), fair comment on a matter of public interest, and privilege.
When should a court restrain publication by way of an interim injunction?
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must satisfy the triple test of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, and, for ex parte relief, the considerations in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das[1]. Defamation, however, is a class apart. Under the principle in Bonnard v. Perryman[2], courts will not restrain an allegedly defamatory publication where the defendant intends to plead truth or fair comment, unless the defence is clearly bound to fail. Until a statement is shown to be false, it is not clear that any wrong has been committed, and the public interest lies in the truth coming out.
The Evolution of the Bonnard Principle
The starting point: For over six decades, the approach was shaped by National Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ashutosh Mukherjee[3], where a learned Single Judge declined to apply Bonnard in India. The reasoning was that in England, justification was the preserve of the jury, so a judge ought not to pre-empt it at the interim stage. India has no jury, and the same court decides the truth at trial, so the ordinary rules would apply.
Doubt without decision: In Reckitt & Colman of India Ltd. v. Jyothi Laboratories Ltd.[4], a Division Bench found it “debatable” whether the English rule was the law and “not unreasonable to assume” it might not apply in India, but left the question open.
Finding its feet: In Khushwant Singh v. Maneka Gandhi[5], the Delhi High Court refused to restrain publication of Khushwant Singh’s autobiography, relying on Lord Denning’s statement in Fraser v. Evans[6] that a court will not restrain a defamatory publication where the defendant intends to justify it or make fair comment on a matter of public interest.
Proof Before Prior Restraint: Shree Maheshwar Hydel Power Corporation Ltd. v. Chitroopa Palit[7] adopted a qualified version of Bonnard. A mere plea of justification would not defeat interim relief; the defendant must also show bona fides, public interest, reasonable care to ascertain the truth, and sufficient material capable of being tested.
Public Interest Over Private Reputation: In Tata Sons Ltd. v. Greenpeace International[8], the Delhi High Court refused to injunct an online game linking Tata to a port project harmful to Olive Ridley turtles, holding that the allegations could only be tested at trial and that an injunction would freeze public debate.
The shift in reasoning: In Bloomberg Television Production Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd.[9], the Supreme Court endorsed the Bonnard standard, holding that pre-trial injunctions, particularly ex parte ones, should be granted only where the content is shown to be “malicious” or “palpably false”. Relying on Fraser, it also noted that the better reason for the rule is not the jury but the public interest in the truth coming out, which undercut the very foundation of National Sugar Mills.
Standing Tall: Bonnard Finds Its Voice: That question has now been squarely answered. In Arpit Mangal & Anr. v. Emami Limited & Ors.[10], a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside an ex parte injunction against a product-testing influencer whose video flagged excessive lead and mercury in “Zandu Ashwagandha Gold Plus”. The Court held that the Bonnard principle is squarely applicable in Indian law, that National Sugar Mills stands impliedly overruled by Bloomberg, and that the burden lies on the plaintiff to show that the defence of truth is certain to fail.
Conclusion: Let the Truth Out
Born in 1891, the Bonnard principle matters more today than ever. Those who inform consumers are no longer only journalists and regulators, but independent creators with laboratory reports, cameras and audiences of millions. For many consumers, a product review on YouTube or Instagram now carries more weight than an advertisement or a label. That influence brings responsibility, but it also makes such speech a real force for accountability in markets where regulators often cannot keep up.
Arpit Mangal shows why this matters. The Court described the video as “motivated more by the need to educate the public” about lead and mercury “than commercial interest”, and held that “it is precisely such free speech in public interest which is sought to be protected by the Bonnard principle.” The plaintiff’s own experts did not dispute that the heavy metals were present; they only sought to explain why. In refusing to stay its judgment, the Court recognised that every day a gag order remains in force is a day on which consumers keep buying a product without knowing what the evidence says about it.
In our view, this is exactly why the Bonnard principle must be applied rigorously in the age of influencers, not diluted. Commercial plaintiffs have deep pockets and can bury criticism under litigation long before the truth is tested. The Supreme Court in Bloomberg warned that a pre-trial injunction often operates as a “death sentence” for the speech it restrains. For an individual creator, one such order can be enough to silence them and to deter others from testing products at all. Placing the burden on the plaintiff is not a favour to influencers. It protects the public’s right to know.
This protection is not a licence for recklessness. Bonnard shields speech grounded in evidence, not speech that is careless or made up. Arpit Mangal is instructive because the appellants relied on accredited laboratory reports, a transparent testing process, relevant qualifications and no undisclosed commercial tie with a competitor.
The principle therefore strikes the right balance for the digital age. Reputation is protected by vindication after trial, not by silence beforehand. For businesses, the answer to an unfavourable lab report is a better product or better evidence, not a quick injunction.
With Arpit Mangal, the Calcutta High Court has laid to rest a jury-based objection that lingered for over sixty years, and aligned Calcutta with Bloomberg and the constitutional promise of Article 19(1)(a). When there is a real chance that a statement is true, the law now favours letting it be heard.
[1] (1994) 4 SCC 225
[2] [1891] 2 Ch 269
[3] 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 74
[4] 1999 SCC OnLine Cal 155
[5] AIR 2002 Del 58
[6] [1969] 1 All ER 8
[7] AIR 2004 Bom 143
[8] (2011) 178 DLT 705
[9] (2025) 1 SCC 741
[10] F.M.A. No. 1036 of 2025, decided on 22 September 2026 by the High Court at Calcutta