The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”) was enacted to provide for control of rents and evictions and of rates of hotels and lodging houses, and for the lease of vacant premises to government, in certain areas in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. The Act envisages setting up of courts of Rent Controller to deal with the cases falling under its purview. By an amendment inserted by Act 18 of 1976, Chapter III-A, consisting of Section 25-A to 25-C, were inserted with effect from 01.12.1975, which deals with “Summary Trial of certain Applications” for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement.
Section 38 DRC Act deals with Appeal to the Tribunal from an order of the Rent Controller. Section 38(1) of the Act provides that an appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller made under this Act only on the question of law to the Rent Control Tribunal. The use of the word “every order” makes it clear that the scope of the appeal is very wide and expansive in nature. In Central Bank of India v. Gokalchand[1], the Apex Court was seized with the question of construction of Section 38(1) of the DRC Act. The court observed that the object of Section 38(1) is to give a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by some order which affects its right or liability. It was held that in the context of Section 38(1), the words “every order of the Controller made under this Act”, though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural in nature and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties.
By virtue of introduction of Section 25-B to Chapter III-A, a special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement was laid down under the DRC Act. Section 25-B (8) of the Act, by providing that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedures specified in the said section, restricts the right of appeal in certain cases. The power of the High Court to call for the records of a case for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under the said section is in accordance with law, were however preserved by way of a proviso to the sub-section (8).
The question which has often confronted the courts dealing while dealing with rent matters is whether the negation of an appeal u/s 25-B (8) DRC Act applies only to the applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement or to other ancillary or subsequent proceedings, such as execution petitions or objections thereto or orders such as setting aside of ex-parte proceedings or order dismissing a petition in default etc. arising out of eviction petitions filed on the ground of bona fide requirement.
In Vinod Kumar Chaudhary v. Narain Devi Taneja[2], the Apex Court was confronted with the question as to whether the remedy available to a tenant against an order of eviction on a petition filed by the landlord on the ground of bona fide requirement was an appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal or a revision to the High Court. The court interpreted that the proviso has to be read as a legislative measure carved out of the sub-section to which it is appended, and the order mentioned therein has to be regarded as an order of the type which the sub-section speaks of i.e. “an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedures specified in this section.” It was held that the order covered by sub-section (8) and proviso thereto would be a final order disposing off an application on a conclusion of the proceedings under sub-section (4) or sub-section (7) of section 25-B DRC Act. Discussing the scheme of the Act, the court came to the conclusion that the remedy against an order passed by the Controller under Chapter III-A would be by way of a revision to the High Court and not by way of appeal under section 38 of the DRC Act. This judgment was thereafter interpreted in R.S. Bakshi & Anr. Vs H.K. Malhari & Anr.[3] to hold that even against an order granting leave to defend to the tenant, the remedy of the landlord was in the form of a petition under section 25-B (8) DRC Act before the High Court and not in the form of an appeal under section 38 of the Act.
The difficulty, however, arises regarding the interpretation of section in relation to proceedings other than adjudication of the application for leave to defend in a case of eviction of a tenant on bona fide requirement.
The Delhi High Court, except possibly one decision, has taken a consistent view to the effect that the negation of appeal under section 25-B (8) lies only in the case of an order for recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedures specified in section 25-B and not to any other application. For application of section 25-B (8), there is requirement of fulfillment of twin conditions, namely- a) the order should be for recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller, and b) such an order should be in accordance with the procedure specified in section 25-B. If either of the conditions are not fulfilled, the debarment of appeal under section 25-B (8) shall not apply.
Section 25-B is a drastic provision which curtails the right of appeal. It has been held in Manoj Kumar v. Bihari Lal[4] that since a drastic measure for eviction of a tenant, particularly in a statute intended to provide protection to tenants against arbitrary and whimsical action of unscrupulous landlord for their eviction, is provided, therefore, a strict interpretation of the provision is to be necessarily given. Once strict interpretation to S. 25-B (8) is given, the application of the said section cannot be extended to other applications which may be incidental or ancillary to application under 25-B (4) DRC Act, such as execution petitions or applications/ objections to execution petitions or applications seeking setting aside of ex-parte decree etc. The words “against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises” and “in accordance with the procedure specified in this section” cannot be expanded to all subsequent orders or collateral proceedings connected with the order for recovery of possession. Such expansion, if allowed, shall militate against the rule of strict construction laid down in Manoj Kumar (supra).
A fundamental rule regarding interpretation of statutes is that if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the ordinary meaning should be given thereto without taking resort to any tools for interpretation. The presumption is that the legislature has deliberately and consciously used the words for carrying out the purpose of the Act. The legal maxim a verbis legis non est recedendum which means, “from the words of law, there must be no departure” need to be kept in mind whenever the question of interpretation is involved. In Feroze N. Dotivala v. P.M. Wadhwani[5], it has been held generally, ordinary meaning is to be assigned to any word or phrase used or defined in a statute. Therefore, unless there is any vagueness or ambiguity, no occasion will arise to interpret the term in a manner which may add something to the meaning of the word which ordinarily does not so mean by the definition itself, more particularly, where it is a restrictive definition. Unless there are compelling reasons to do so, meaning of a restrictive and exhaustive definition should not be expanded or made extensive to embrace things which are strictly not within the meaning of the word as defined.
The Constitution Bench, in RS Nayak vs AR Antulay [6], held that if the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of ambiguity, or the plain meaning of the words used in the statute would be self-defeating.
Once these rules regarding interpretation of statues are applied, it follows that the language of the provision under section 25-B (8) is plain, clear and unambiguous and the same cannot be expanded so as to include within its purview applications which are not for recovery of possession or not in accordance with the procedure specified in the section.
The aspect with regard to negation of right to appeal u/s 25-B (8) DRC Act was an issue under consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ms. Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash[7]. Challenge in this case was to an order passed under section 15(7) of DRC Act; the appeal filed against the said order was dismissed as not maintainable in view of section 25-B (8). The court held that reliance on section 25-B (8) to negative an appeal was inept because it was not an order under that special section, but under section 15 of the Act. It was observed that an order striking out the defence is appealable under section 38 and as such the order was appealable. Observing that negation of a right of appeal follows from section 25-B (8) only if the order for recovery is made “in accordance with the procedure specified in this section” (i.e. 25-B). Since the dispossession in the case was not ordered under the special provision in section 25-B but under section 15, an appeal was held to be maintainable. Another important ratio flowing from the said judgment is that the theory of merger cannot salvage the order.
A Learned Single judge of the Delhi High Court attempted to distinguish Santosh Mehta’s (supra) case in three judgments namely R.K. Parikh v. Uma Verma[8], Ram Nath v. OP Khandaria[9] and Prem Nath Kapur v. Ram Shiksh Mehta[10], but all the three judgments were later disapproved by the Division Bench in the case of Madan Lal Bhatia v. Rattan Sehgal[11], wherein it was held that an order passed u/s 15(2) is appealable under section 38 DRC Act. The court observed that it is no doubt true that Chapter III-A was introduced in the Act by Amendment Act 18 of 1976 to provide for a summary trial of certain applications, but the said procedure is confined to the extent indicated in the Chapter itself. Once the leave to defend is granted, it does not mean that the landlord has no remedy against the defaulting tenant even though the proceedings may continue for a long period. The right of appeal is taken away only if the order for recovery is made or declined in accordance with the procedure specified in the said Chapter particularly Section 25-B. The same cannot possibly be extended to other provisions contained in the Act.
In Inder Mohan Sachdeva v. Usha International Limited[12], a question was framed as to whether a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was maintainable against an order passed by a Controller or the remedy of appeal should have been pursued. The challenge in this case was to dismissal of eviction petition in default under Order IX Rule 8 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Relying upon the decision in Central Bank of India (supra), the court went on to hold that an appeal u/s section 38(1) was maintainable.
In the case of Mst. Azian Bi v. Gangadhar[13], the question referred for consideration before a Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court was whether an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal under section 38 DRC Act against an order passed by the Controller refusing to stay the dispossession of a person claiming independent title to the premises in question. The court referred to section 42 of the Act, which lays down that an order made by a Controller under Act shall be executable as a decree of civil court and for this purpose the Controller shall have all the powers of a civil court. Reference was also made to Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 which lays down that in deciding any question relating to procedure not specifically provided by the Act or Rules, the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal shall, as far as possible, be guided by the provisions contained in Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The court went on to hold that an appeal against such an order was maintainable under Section 38 of the DRC Act.
In R.K. Sharma v. Praveen Gupta[14], the High Court of Delhi was called upon to decide on the preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution when the remedy u/s 38(1) DRC Act to challenge the ex-parte decree was available. The Court observed that the order setting aside ex-parte decree cannot be regarded as a mere procedural order as it decides valuable rights and liabilities of parties and hence, an appeal u/s 38 DRC Act was held to be maintainable against such an order.
However, in the case of Bata India Limited vs Sarla Sharma[15], which case also dealt with maintainability of an appeal against an order seeking setting aside of an ex parte decree, a Single Bench of the Delhi High Court took a view contrary to the view taken in R.K. Sharma (supra) and held that an appeal seeking setting aside of an ex-parte was not maintainable. Since the earlier judgment in R.K. Sharma (supra) was not considered in Bata India Limited (supra), though being on the same issue, the latter judgment may be per in curium.
In Kundan Lal Handa v. Gyan Chand Jain[16] relying upon Central Bank of India (supra), this Hon’ble Court held that an appeal u/s 38 DRC Act was the proper remedy against an order passed for substitution of a decree holder.
From a conspectus of the above judgments, interpretations and discussion, it can be concluded that the right to appeal is a creature of a statue and the question whether there is a right to appeal or not will have to be considered on the interpretation of the provisions of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration [DN Taneja v. Bhajan Lal[17]]. The scope of Section 25-B (8) DRC Act, negating the right of appeal, is restricted only to an order for the recovery of possession for any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedures specified in the section and cannot be extended to negate the right of appeal to subsequent or ancillary proceedings such as application deciding objections to execution petition, application for setting aside ex-parte proceedings, applications for substitution of decree holder or application refusing stay of dispossession of a person claiming an independent title to the premises or application challenging dismissal of eviction petition in default under Order IX Rule 8 CPC etc. All these orders and applications, though may be traceable to the original order of eviction passed under special procedure prescribed under Chapter III-A of the Act, but the said fact is not sufficient to bring these orders within the purview of section 25-B (8) DRC Act because such orders are not passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 25-B, but are passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or otherwise which is not in accordance with the special procedure laid down in Section 25-B of DRC Act.
[1] AIR 1967 SC 799
[2] (1980) 2 SCC 120
[3] 2003 (67) DRJ 410
[4] (2001) 4 SCC 655
[5] (2003) 1 SCC 433
[6] (1984) 2 SCC 183
[7] (1980) 3 SCC 610
[8] AIR 1979 Del 17
[9] AIR 1980 Del 23
[10] 18 (1980) DLT 300
[11] 18 (1980) DLT 513
[12] 189 (2012) DLT 5
[13] ILR (1978) II Del 346
[14] 71 (1998) DLT 55
[15] MANU/DE/0774/2021
[16] MANU/DE/0312/1971
[17] (1988) 3 SCC 26